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ABSTRACT 
On September 25, 2015, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping 
announced the formation of a U.S.–China Cyber Agreement. After years of suspected 
cyber-enabled economic espionage, many analysts considered the Agreement a 
surprising and welcome development. Still, other analysts remained pessimistic as to the 
Agreement’s potential impact in changing behavior, predicting Chinese behavior would 
remain unchanged or be altered in a way that would not significantly reduce the level of 
cyber espionage instances or damages. Given the two years since the signing of 
Agreement, this thesis examines data from pre- and post-Agreement periods for potential 
trends and impacts, to address the question, “How have the results of the 2015 U.S.–
China Cyber Agreement impacted the prospects of future U.S.–China cooperation in 
cyberspace?” To evaluate this question, this thesis first examines data from FireEye, 
Hackmageddon, and other cybersecurity organizations, which report the volume of 
attacks and other relevant trends. This thesis then repurposes the Schmitt Analysis to 
provide an alternative and more comprehensive perspective of China’s compliance with 
the Agreement. Last, this thesis surveys Chinese policies from the pre- and post-
Agreement periods, highlighting notable differences. 
After examination of the data, this thesis finds that the Agreement, though likely 
not a “watershed moment,” played a significant role in accelerating Chinese behavior 
toward a reduction in the level of attacks. Data from FireEye, Hackmageddon, and other 
cybersecurity organizations suggests a genuine effort on the part of the Chinese to 
comply with the Agreement. Additionally, data examined by repurposing the Schmitt 
Analysis supports similar findings. Furthermore, Chinese policies appear to have shifted 
following the Agreement, toward a cyber posture more consistent with U.S. aspirations. 
In sum, the Agreement plays a significant role toward fostering more friendly U.S.–China 
cyber relations. 
vi
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
How have the results of the 2015 U.S.–China Cyber Agreement impacted the 
prospects of future U.S.–China cooperation in cyberspace? 
During a 2015 summit, President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping 
“exchanged views on a range of global, regional, and bilateral subjects.”1 One area of 
particular interest was the “cybersecurity issue.”2 Both presidents expressed their 
growing concerns of “cyber-threats” and the need for China and the United States to 
work together as the “two major cyber countries.”3 Consequently, the two reached a 
cooperative agreement, also known as the 2015 U.S.-China Cyber Agreement 
(Agreement), which helped clarify the role of states with cyber espionage.4  
A significant milestone for U.S.–China relations, the Agreement also represented 
an important step forward in establishing universal cyber laws and norms; however, as 
President Obama noted, the actual actions following the agreement dictate much of the 
scope of the Agreement’s impact and implications. Accordingly, this thesis assesses the 
actual actions taken following the Agreement and examines the implications of the 
Agreement for both the evolving U.S.–China relationship and the future prospects for 
cooperation and norm development in cyberspace. More specifically, this thesis explores 
the following questions. What actions have the U.S. and China taken that can be 
attributed to the Agreement and what impacts have those actions produced? Do these 
impacts have broader implications?  
                                                 
1 “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” The White House, 
September 25, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-
jinpings-state-visit-united-states; “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic 
of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2014,  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-
president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. 
2 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press 
Conference.”  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
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Overall, this thesis finds that the Agreement played a significant role in altering 
Chinese behavior, but was not necessarily a pivotal turning point. The Agreement 
emerged as part of a wider swath of changes between the United States and China. In 
terms of the volume of cyberattacks, data from FireEye showed that the number of 
cyberattacks on the United States attributed to China was declining prior to the 
Agreement. The Agreement, however, accelerated and stabilized the decline; post-
Agreement numbers showed a greater rate of decline and less variation from month to 
month. Furthermore, utilizing an adapted method of analysis derived from the Schmitt 
Analysis suggests similar results. Cyber-attacks by China are becoming less damaging 
and the United States is getting better at tying attacks to China. Last, changes in Chinese 
cyber policies also suggest a broader shift in Chinese behavior. Post-Agreement changes 
in Chinese policies suggest a trend toward stronger U.S.-China cyber relations. 
Additionally, new cybersecurity laws suggest a change in Chinese perceptions of 
cyberspace more closely aligned with U.S. perceptions. Thus, there is significant 
evidence to be optimistic and that the Agreement may play a key role in solidifying U.S.-
China cyber relations.  
Alternatively, however, the evidence also suggests a necessity for the United 
States to progress cautiously. Data from Matt Tait and other analysts suggest that punitive 
measures by the United States more accurately represent the cause for the changes in 
Chinese behavior. Evidence under other criteria from the Schmitt Analysis also suggest 
reason to progress cautiously as the focus of Chinese cyberattacks shifts towards civilian 
versus military targets. Changes in Chinese policies may also just be an excuse for the 
CCP to establish tighter control of cyberspace. These potential spoilers, however, do not 
completely offset or undermine the evidence to see developments optimistically. For 
example, while the declining trend of the volume of cyberattacks could quickly reverse, 
that change has yet to occur. As a result, the United States should focus on what is 
happening rather than what might happen. In the end, this thesis recommends the United 
States progress with cautious optimism. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Prior to the Agreement, the relationship between the United States and China on 
cyberspace can best be described as contentious.5 Starting in 2007, allegations of 
cyberattacks from China on the United States began to emerge, sparking the first embers 
of tension between the two.6 Tensions continued to escalate through 2012 following 
attacks on several U.S. companies like Google, Lockheed Martin, and RSA, all of which 
seemed to come to a boiling point in 2013 with two events.7 Mandiant, a cybersecurity 
firm now part of FireEye, released a report directly implicating China’s involvement in 
cyberattacks; and Edward Snowden released a massive leak of classified information that 
implicated the National Security Agency’s (NSA) involvement in attacks of their own.8 
Both sides appeared to face culpability for escalating cyberattacks, which some analysts 
saw as the makings of a cyber war.9 
Following the years of mutual accusations and buildup of tensions, relief did 
come. In April 2013, the two sides agreed to work cooperatively to address cyber issues, 
breaking the cycle of escalation. For that purpose, they agreed to establish a cybersecurity 
working group.10 Cooperative efforts, however, were short-lived. After the U.S. Justice 
Department indictment of five PLA officers, China suspended the working group, ending 
the only formal cooperative link between the two.11 Consequently, in April 2015, it came 
                                                 
5 Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, and Astrid Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in 
Cyberspace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1335.html.   
6 Amy Chang, “Warring State: China’s Cybersecurity Strategy,” Center for a New American Security, 
December 2014, http://cfcollegefoundation.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/CNAS_WarringState_Chang.pdf. 
7 Shashank Bengali, Ken Dilanian, and Alexandra Zavis, “Timeline: Chinese Cyber Attack 
Disclosures,” Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2013, http://timelines.latimes.com/la-fg-china-cyber-disclosures-
timeline/. 
8 Chang, “Warring State.” 
9 “The U.S. vs. China: A Very Civil (Cyber) War,” InfoSecurity, June 26, 2012, 
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazine-features/the-us-vs-china-a-very-civil-cyber-war/. 
10 Robert O’brien and Shiran Shen, “Cybersecurity between the United States and China,” Policy 
Innovations, May 28, 2013, accessed March 11, 2017, 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000260. 
11 Chang, “Warring State.”  
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as no surprise when President Obama issued an Executive Order declaring a “national 
emergency” and authorizing sanctions to deal with the threat of “significant malicious 
cyber-enabled activities.”12 Cooperation failed, sending the two sides back towards an 
escalating spiral of retaliation. So, when the Agreement was announced at the end of 
2015, it came as a surprise that both sides were still willing to act cooperatively.13  
Cooperation between the United States and China has the potential to shape 
global cyber norms and, in turn, further development of international law on cyberspace. 
The two nations, arguably, represent the largest and most significant powers. They have 
the top two GDPs in the world with a combined GDP (in 2016, in USD) of nearly $30 
trillion.14 Comparatively, the next 16 economies combined are still less than that.15 
Additionally, both have the top two militaries in terms of spending and, arguably, 
strength.16 Furthermore, because both nations’ ideologies and political structures are 
diametrically opposed, their cooperation lends itself to a degree of legitimacy on the 
global stage. If the United States and China can work together and establish norms on an 
issue, the rest of the world may follow suit. 
By analyzing the Agreement and the actions taken since, this thesis provides 
insight into the future outcomes and implications the Agreement has on the international 
community and towards shaping norms in cyberspace. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the recentness of the Agreement, few scholarly articles analyzing the 
results of the Agreement exist. Analysts, however, provide a wide array of perspectives 
                                                 
12  “Executive Order—“Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious 
Cyber-Enabled Activities,” The White House, April 1, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/04/01/executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-m. 
13 Harold, Libicki, and Cevallos et al., Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, 79. 
14 “List of Countries by Projected GDP,” List of Countries by Projected GDP 2016, StatisticsTimes, 
accessed February 1, 2017, http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Jeremy Bender and Skye Gould, “The 35 Most Powerful Militaries in the World,” Business Insider 
(July 10, 2014), accessed February 1, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/35-most-powerful-militaries-
in-the-world-2014-. 
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of the issues surrounding the Agreement. This literature gives a review of those 
perspectives to lay background information necessary to address the research question. 
The literature review is divided into four parts: 1) the “‘Cyber Problem’ in U.S.-China 
Relations,” 2) current evaluations of the Agreement, 3) potential areas to better 
measure/evaluate the Agreement, 4) broader impacts.17 
1. The Cyber Problem in U.S.-China Relations  
While scholars agree that there is a cyber problem between the United States and 
China, there is not a universal consensus of what the problem is. Scholars offer an array 
of analysis and perspectives of the problems the two sides faced. In general, 
interpretations of U.S.-China cyber relations mainly vary in terms of which country is 
seen as more responsible for aggravating cyber activities. This section provides details of 
the different perspectives. 
a. China’s Fault 
Many analysts argue the dilemma is one of a competing perspective between the 
United States and China. From a U.S. perspective, China is the aggressor and the main 
culprit behind attacks.18 Incidents like the ones listed in “Cyber Incidents Attributed to 
China” by Laura Saporito and James Lewis in seem to support the China’s fault view.19 
Mandiant’s report, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” further 
confirms these views by not only tracing attacks back to specific individuals, but also the 
locations and desktop screenshots of the attacker’s computer.20 While neither is 
indisputable proof of the Chinese government operating as the aggressor, the evidence 
seems to suggest a little more than coincidence. 
                                                 
17 Harold Libicki, and Cevallos et al., Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace.  
18 Ibid. 
19 Laura Saporito and James A. Lewis, Cyber Incidents Attributed to China, report, CSIS, March 11, 
2013, accessed February 15, 2017, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/130314_Chinese_hacking.pdf. 
20 M. I. Center, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant, Tech. Rep, 
Tech. Rep., 2013. 
 6
Mandiant’s report, in particular, provided several details that make attribution to 
China quite specific. The evidence details APT1’s pattern of activity and the trail back to 
PLA Unit 61398.21 The report also ties China’s motives to APT1 as the cyberattack 
victims are all companies in industries listed as critical to China’s strategic plans, 
including China’s “12th Five Year Plan.”22 Mandiant also provides even more 
incriminating details by identifying specific actors by name and provides minute details, 
like the tools used and the sheer size necessary to launch some of the attacks that 
attribution is beyond reproach.  
The indictment by the U.S. District Court also supports Mandiant’s findings. 
While presenting much of the similar data like IP addresses, the indictment also provides 
a list of incidents with dates and the associated actor responsible for the attack.23 While 
China, and other critics, may argue that the evidence is circumstantial and lacking 
definitive proof, the specificity, sources, and thoroughness of the evidence leave little 
doubt regarding China’s behavior in cyberspace. 
b. U.S. Is a Threat 
From China’s perspective, however, China is the victim.24 China argues it faces a 
greater threat and problem of cyberattacks, and the United States is one of the aggressors. 
China argues that the United States is the overwhelming hegemonic power. One 
particularly strong view is that the United States has an overwhelming advantage in 
cyberspace, notably in access, research, and development of cyber technologies.25 These 
views claim there is clear disparity in power and that the United States is the only one 
capable of attributing cyberattacks to a particular actor. Furthermore, China is not only 
                                                 
21 M. I. Center, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units.”  
22 Ibid.  
23 United States of America vs Wang Dong, Sun Kailing, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui, 
no. 14–118 (PA, District Ct, Western District May 1, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/5122014519132358461949.pdf. 
24 Harold et al., Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace, 8. 
25 Melissa E. Hathaway, Strategic Advantage: Why America Should Care About Cybersecurity, report, 
October 2009, accessed February 15, 2017, 
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Hathaway.Strategic%20Advantage.Why%20Am
erica%20Should%20Care%20About%20Cybersecurity.pdf .   
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incapable of attribution, but as a developing nation, is “the single largest victim of cyber 
crime and hacking in the world.”26 In sum, their view is the United States is strong and 
China is weak.27 
Scholars note that China could also have other possible motives. Some point to a 
lack of trust in China, implying “things would be much better if the United States trusted 
China more.”28 Under this perspective, the Agreement could be a tool to help stem 
unwarranted criticism and accusations aimed at China. One of the most pressing concerns 
is the issue of China’s sovereignty in cyber space. As President Xi alluded to during the 
2014 World Internet Conference, like any other territorial domain (air, land, and sea), 
cyberspace, too, contains “sovereign ‘virtual territory.’”29 Whereas the U.S. believes in a 
boundary-less cyberspace, for the Chinese, there is an underlying “assumption that the 
cyberspace is the natural extension, or a new dimension, of national sovereignty.”30 
Since people and computers exist in the physical world, so does cyberspace. Connecting 
to the Internet requires physical connections like routers and computer servers, and it is 
these physical connections over which states can exert their authority.31 For instance, like 
going over bridges, Internet users must go across certain “bridges” to cross from one area 
to another, and it is a collection of these bridges that form the Internet as a whole. As a 
result, the bridges themselves along with the people crossing the bridges are the 
responsibility of the bridge owners. The owners, as this Chinese argument about 
cyberspace would go, have a right and responsibility to ensure the safety of the users. At 
                                                 
26 Michael Sulmeyer and Amy Chang, “Three Observations on China’s Approach to State Action in 
Cyberspace,” Lawfare (web blog), January 22, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-observations-
chinas-approach-state-action-cyberspace. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” China Leadership 
Monitor, no. 42 (Fall 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/email/South_Asia/img/CLM42MSnew.pdf; Li 
Yan, “Reforming Internet Governance and the Role of China,” Focus Asia, no. 12 (February 2015): 1–12, 
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-LiYan-Reforming-Internet-Governance-and-the-role-of-
China.pdf. 
30  Liu Yangyue, “China’s Perspective on Cyber Security,” in “Perspectives on Cybersecurity,” 




the same time, however, users are also subject to the rules and laws of the individual or 
state owners.  
Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, U.S. actions and rhetoric are outlandish 
and hypocritical. U.S. claims that authoritarian controls over information are oppressive 
measures ignore the state’s role of “raising the ideological and moral standard of the 
citizens.”32 As the “bridge” owner, the state, or the CCP in this instance, has a duty to 
protect and guide its people using the bridges. Furthermore, China also refutes U.S. 
accusations, claiming themselves as the “victim of severe U.S. cyber theft, wiretapping 
and surveillance activities.”33 In the view of the Chinese, the U.S. is hypocritical, calling 
China the bully while possessing “‘monopolistic advantages’ [longduan youshi]” and 
possessing the true hegemonic power.34 Thus, the Agreement may be a way to protect 
Chinese citizens.35  
2. Current Evaluations of the Agreement 
Despite the recentness of the Agreement, several scholars have offered some early 
evaluations, which to date, mainly vary in terms of the degree to which it has had any 
impact at all. At one end, some scholars argue preliminary results of the Agreement 
provide evidence to be optimistic for U.S.-China cyber cooperation. At the opposite end, 
other scholars argue the results so far are minimal, and so are reason to be pessimistic. 
This section outlines the arguments presented by both ends as well as the more moderate 
views in between. 
                                                 
32 Swaine, “Chinese Views on Cybersecurity in Foreign Relations,” 5.  
33 “China Reacts Strongly to U.S. Announcement of Indictment Against Chinese Personnel,” Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 20, 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1157520.shtml. 
34 Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki, and Astrid Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in 
Cyberspace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 9, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1335.html.  
35 Gary Brown and Christopher Yung, “Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement, Part 2: 




a. Genuine Attempt at Cooperation 
In the year since the Agreement, some analysts have claimed the results represent 
a genuine attempt at cooperation. Scott Warren Harold, associate director of the RAND 
Center for Asia Pacific Policy, claims the Agreement is “a good first step.”36 He 
explains, similar to President Obama, that the Agreement is progress towards addressing 
the “problem of Chinese espionage.”37 Prior to the Agreement, the United States has 
been essentially hemorrhaging money for years due to the EMCE and has faced 
numerous intrusions, but since the Agreement has seen a reduction of intrusions of U.S. 
companies from China. He elaborates that “a genuine reduction in Chinese economically-
motivated cyber espionage could go some way toward easing tensions in the broader 
bilateral U.S.-China relationship.”38FireEye’s report, “Redline Drawn: China 
Recalculates its use of Cyber Espionage,” also suggests a drop in attacks following the 
Agreement after an analysis of attacks by “suspected China-based groups” from February 
2013 to May 2016.39  
b. No Major Impact 
The dominant opinion, including FireEye, however, is that the Agreement has 
made no major impact. Rather than seeing the Agreement as a “watershed moment,” 
critics, instead, argue the Agreement is “one point amongst dramatic changes that had 
been taking place for years.”40 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (USCC) provide a good summary of this perspective in the “2016 Annual 
Report to Congress.”41  
                                                 
36 Scott Warren Harold, “The US-China Cyber Agreement: A Good First Step,” The Cipher Brief, 
July 31, 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/tech/us-china-cyber-agreement-possibly-good-first-
step-1092. 
37 Harold, “The US-China Cyber Agreement” 
38 Ibid.  




41 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2016 Annual Report to Congress,” 
November 2016, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/Chapter3_Section_1%28page119%29.pdf. 
 10
The USCC authors point out, public reports from FireEye and CSIS are unable to 
attribute the decline in frequency of attacks to the Agreement.42 Instead, punitive 
measures by the United States against China better explains the data as seen in a graph by 
Matt Tait, founder of Capital Alpha Security, displayed in Figure 1.43  
                                                 
42 Ibid.  




Figure 1.  FireEye’s Data Overlaid with Policy.44 
                                                 
44 Matt Tait, Twitter post, 21 June 2016, 11:43 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/745280882076958720.  
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It appears that punitive measures, rather than the Agreement, have caused the 
decline (Figure 1). The decline begins in 2014, before the Agreement, and continues. The 
major inflection points coincide with punitive actions taken by the United States against 
China. Provided this data, the view of the proverbial stick as the necessary element, a 
view that Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, has argued for years as 
necessity to “deter Chinese economic espionage against U.S. companies,” seems 
reasonable.45   
c. Feigned Cooperation 
Alternatively, while evidence suggests a drop in the volume of attacks, analysts 
debate whether volume is even the right metric to use. The overall drop in attacks could 
also represent a shift from “prolific amateur attacks toward more centralized, 
professionalized, and sophisticated attacks by a smaller number of actors.”46 In a 2015 
hearing before the USCC, Mr. John Costello, Congressional Innovation Fellow, New 
America, explained that the threat of Chinese theft and espionage has not gone down but 
instead changed to that of a “Russian model.”47 He explains that China’s model faced 
several problems operating in cyberspace because of their decentralized model of 
control.48 Their cyber actors struggled at deconflicting efforts; multiple actors attacked 
the same target, repeating efforts. Thus, the drop in attacks could instead represent the 
adoption of a more sophisticated and centralized model (i.e., the Russia Model). A 
Congressional Research Report on the Chinese Military provides support evidence as 
China appears to focus on modernizing their military towards “quality over quantity.”49 
                                                 
45 Dmitri Alperovitch, “U.S. – China Agreement on Cyber Intrusions: An Inflection Point,” 
Crowdstrike (blog), September 25, 2015, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/cyber-agreement/. 
46 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2016 Annual Report to Congress.”  
47 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Hearing Before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission,” June 09, 2016, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/June%2009,%202016%20Hearing%20Transcript.pdf. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ian E. Rinehart, “The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress,” (CRS Report No. 
R44196) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44196.pdf. 
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Similarly, rather than cooperation, the Agreement could also be a tool in China’s 
changing military strategy. As Harold, Libicki, and Cevallos explain, China might use the 
Agreement to provide the CCP with the authority to “rein in its own freelance hackers.”50 
Breaking hackers into two basic groups of amateurs or elites, China has elite teams like 
APT1 and amateur groups like freelance or moonlighting hackers.51 The Agreement can 
provide the CCP with an excuse to stop attacks outside of the CCP’s purview by 
leveraging the United States as the oppressor forcing China’s hand.  
The common theme in each explanation is that so far the Agreement has had little 
to no impact. Either the Agreement simply happened while punitive actions were already 
creating a decline, or the Agreement is a tool that enhances China’s strategy. In any case, 
these views present a picture of little to no promise of an international agreement working 
to solve the issue of cyberespionage and theft.  
This pessimistic diagnosis, however, is based on casual use of evidence and is still 
far from a forgone conclusion. Hence, this thesis examines the Agreement in two ways. 
First, current evidence is lacking in two ways: one, the data used only explores attacks up 
to May 2016, a relatively short time frame; and two, it uses volume as the sole metric. As 
a result, this thesis research provides updated data and analysis of a full year of data since 
the Agreement; and this thesis measures attacks using alternative measurement criteria. 
Second, this thesis expands current views to include broader implications of the 
Agreement including impacts to U.S.–China relations and the development of global 
cyber norms. 
3. Potential Areas to Measure 
While much of the commentary presents a pessimistic view and suggests little 
impact from the Agreement, the only metric the articles refer to is the volume of 
cyberattacks, which begs a broader question. How can the United States measure success 
of the Agreement?  
                                                 
50 Harold, Libicki, and Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace.  
51 Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (Abingdon: Routledge ; London : The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2016). 
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a. Costs of Cybercrime 
At a broader level, researchers have utilized economic impact as a measurement 
of cybercrime and espionage. In a 2015 report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (USCC) used a cost estimate from McAfee’s cybersecurity 
branch of “$375 billion to $575 billion annually worldwide.”52 Lloyd’s Risk Index 
provides a similar figure of “$400 billion a year.”53 Neither, however, compares to the 
estimate provided by Cybersecurity Ventures, $3 trillion in 2015.54 The range indicates a 
high amount of variance, the reciprocal of precision. The reason why is simple: each 
group has a different way to calculate the costs.  
Moreover, even though Lloyd and McAfee both identify similar numbers, their 
methodology of calculation is different. In Lloyd’s calculation, their figure is formulated 
by accounting for “restitution, fines, business disruption, legal and remediation 
services.”55 Lloyd’s calculation focuses on direct costs to business, costs that are 
relatively easier to identify because they are actual and realized by business. McAfee, on 
the other hand, includes indirect costs into their calculation, which includes items like 
“additional costs for securing networks, and the cost of recovering from cyberattacks, 
including reputational damage to the hacked company.”56 Indirect costs, as McAfee 
emphasizes, “show the full effect of cybercrime.”57 Comparing McAfee and Lloyd’s 
estimates, however, does not appear to support McAfee’s argument of indirect costs. If 
indirect costs were a more significant factor, McAfee’s estimate should be significantly 
                                                 




53 Francesca Spidalieri, Understanding Cyber Threats: Lessons for the Boardroom, report, September 
2016, accessed February 15, 2017, http://pellcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Understanding-Cyber-
Threats-Lessons-for-the-Boardroom.pdf. 
54 Morgan, Hackerpocalyse. 
55 Spidalieri, Understanding Cyber Threats. 
56 McAfee, Net Losses.  
57 Matthew Benigni, Kathleen M. Carley, and Sumeet Kumar, “The Impact of U.S. Cyber Policies on 
Cyber-Attacks Trend,” Carnegie Mellon University, 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers/2016ImpactofUSCyber.pdf. 
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higher than Lloyd’s. Rather than definitive proof of economic damages, the three 
different calculations show the difficulty in trying to estimate a specific figure.  
b. Cyber Policies as Measurement Criteria 
Other methods have also measured the impact of the Agreement. Similar to Tait, 
in the article “The Impact of U.S. Cyber Policies on Cyber-Attacks Trend,” the authors 
challenged presumptions that cyberattacks on the United States are increasing.58 Within 
their methodology, they perform a trend analysis comparing the different year’s data 
against each other. Then, the authors, similar to Tait, attempt to find specific policies to 
compare against the data and discover whether there is correlation. Their analysis, 
however, found little statistical evidence of the Agreement causing any significant 
changes. Although comparing policy actions against trends in cyberattacks provides some 
room to provide a better picture of the policy impacts following the Agreement, current 
results have yet to produce promising results. 
This thesis will advance the use of cyber policies as a measurement criterion by 
providing a comprehensive summary and analysis of China’s cyber policies. By detailing 
cyber policies from before and after the Agreement, this thesis examines the changes 
China has, or has not, made. Then, utilizing changes in policy as a measurement criterion, 
a trend analysis will highlight the degree to which the Agreement has made an impact. 
4. Broader Impacts 
Also missing from current assessments of the Agreement is an analysis of the 
broader impacts, any impacts beyond the four main stipulations, listed below (full text in 
Appendix A), in the Agreement: 
1. Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a manner consistent with 
their respective national laws and relevant international 
obligations, with requests to investigate cybercrimes, collect 
electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity 
emanating from their territory. 
2. Neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support 
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.   
                                                 
58 Ibid.  
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3. Both sides are committed to making common effort to further 
identify and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in 
cyberspace within the international community.   
4. The United States and China agree to establish a high-level joint 
dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues.59  
At the immediate onset of the Agreement, analysts like Adam Segal speculated 
the Agreement could affect much more than just the flow of cyberattacks and 
espionage.60 They suggest that the Agreement, borrowing the influences from the United 
States and China, could send a global message signifying major changes to international 
institutions and norms. Indeed, since the signing, scholars have noted some signs of 
broader impacts.  
One impact the Agreement seems to have made is propagating more bilateral 
agreements. As Segal discussed, “a month after signing the agreement with the United 
States, China inked a similar deal with the United Kingdom, and, in November 2015, 
China, Brazil, Russia, the United States, and other members of the Group of Twenty 
accepted the norm against conducting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property.”61 
With more countries forming bilateral agreements pledging that state sponsored cyber 
espionage is unacceptable, norms against cyber espionage begin to form.  
Evaluation of institutions and norms emerging because of the Agreement, 
however, has yet to be undertaken beyond informal speculation.62 A review of 
institutions, laws, or regulations before and after the Agreement could lead to a much 
different evaluation than current commentary. If little has changed, the arguments 
presented by current skeptics would hold more weight, and thus, like some analysts 
suggested, policy should focus on punitive measures to ensure results. If, however, the 
                                                 
59 “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States.” 
60 Joseph Marks, “Obama, Xi vow not to steal each others’ secrets,” Politico, September 25, 2015, 
accessed March 11, 2017, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/obama-xi-vow-not-to-steal-each-others-
secrets-214077. 
61 Adam Segal, “The U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, September 28, 2016, accessed March 21, 2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2016/09/28/the-u-s-
china-cyber-espionage-deal-one-year-later/. 
62 Gary Brown and Christopher D. Yung, “Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement, Part 
3,” The Diplomat, January 21, 2017, accessed March 21, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-
the-us-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-3/. 
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trend of institutions suggests true cooperative efforts, the results of the Agreement may 
be more than just a good first step. Put more simply, as Doug Olenick considers, is the 
Agreement like the “Treaty of Versailles” or “the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT)?”63 The Treaty of Versailles failed, while SALT, arguably, impacted much more 
than just the United States and the Soviet Union. The Agreement could fall into either 
path, or somewhere between, but the results need exploring to evaluate which is more 
likely or evident so that the United States can better focus strategic efforts to prevent or 
lessen cyber theft.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESIS 
Building on a broader base of evidence of the actions taken since Agreement, this 
thesis examines two principal variables:  whether the Agreement generated generally 
positive or negative results, and whether or not it has had impact beyond its explicit 
objectives. These variables yield four possible predictions for emerging conditions 
(Figure 2). 
                                                 
63 Doug Olenick, “U.S.-China Cyber Agreement: Flawed, but a step in the right direction,” SC Media, 




Figure 2.  Potential Outcomes 
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1. Variables 
On the X-axis, the endpoints are defined by whether or not the Agreement has 
created or is creating broader impacts. A narrow impact implies the results are limited to 
the specific stipulations outlined in the Agreement, essentially affecting only state 
sponsored espionage and not much more. The two sides, then, likely are not seeking 
expansive roles or importance in creating global cyber norms. Conversely, a broad impact 
means the results expand beyond the scope of the Agreement and play a larger role, 
influencing changes in either domestic or international institutions. 
On the Y-axis, the endpoints are defined by the results of the Agreement. On one 
end, positive results refer to a decrease in attacks by volume or by the criteria of more 
qualitative analysis based on policy and institutionalization impacts. Negative results are 
trends toward the opposite, an increase in volume and/or severity of attacks, and little to 
no policy or institutional changes. 
2. Prospects 
Based on the disposition of these variables, four possible general directions for 
future developments are possible. The time period since the Agreement is rather short, 
and too many other factors are involved, to make reliable predictions for future 
developments. However, appreciating these general tendencies will allow the thesis, in its 
conclusion, to examine policy-relevant implications of its findings. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will focus primarily on determining the current circumstances for each 
axis. To determine the Y-axis, an analysis of attacks will be performed using two metrics. 
First, given another year since FireEye’s data, this thesis will revisit data on the volume 
attacks. By synthesizing data from FireEye as well as Statista and Hackmageddon, this 
thesis provides a more thorough evaluation of the statistical data.  
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Second, this thesis repurposes the Schmitt Analysis to help determine whether the 
results of the Agreement are positive or negative.64 The Schmitt Analysis, originally 
designed as a legal framework for casus belli, provides an alternative to measuring 
cyberattacks rather than assessing attacks only by volume or by technique. Professor 
Schmitt suggested a framework of seven “factors that would likely influence assessments 
by States as to whether particular cyber operations amounted to a use of force.”65 This 
thesis will adapt the Schmitt Analysis to provide a common and more expansive 
measurement to distinguish significant from incidental cyberattacks. Applying this 
measure of time can provide a more accurate litmus test of whether China’s behavior in 
cyberspace has changed. Using the seven Schmitt Analysis criteria may reveal trends in 
Chinese cyberattacks that continue to cross different thresholds or show a more positive 
trend with a decline of cyber brinksmanship. Moreover, the seven different factors help 
overcome a reliance on only measuring volume of attacks and the pitfalls of using 
singular variable framework.  
This application is an expansion of prior similar applications of the Schmitt 
Analysis. In the paper, “Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: 
A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System,” the authors add a 
quantitative scale to each of the factors. By applying a numeric rating, the authors attempt 
to narrow the “‘grey area’ of uncertainty” and provide “a framework for evaluating 
differences in interpretations of the law.”66  This thesis utilizes the same quantitative 
scale to provide a “more academically rigorous evaluation.”67  By applying a stable 
metric via use of the Schmitt Analysis, this thesis may provide a better determination of 
whether attacks are more sophisticated or severe than previously.  
                                                 
64 Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of Force, Collective 
Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflicts,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: 
Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2010), 151–177.  
65 Ibid. 
66 James B. Michael, Thomas C. Wingfield, and Duminda Wijesekera, “Measured Responses to Cyber 
Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-Intensive System,” in 
Proc. of 27th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference, pp. 622–626, 
November 3–6, 2003.  
67 Michael, “Measured Responses to Cyber Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis.” 
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Lastly, this thesis will research and compile China’s cyber policies prior to and 
after the Agreement. Then, taking the analysis of volume of attacks and Schmitt Analysis, 
a comparison of both will be made against China’s cyber policies to help confirm or 
eliminate policy impacts as a causal element as Tait had done previously. 
To determine the X-axis, this thesis looks at institutional changes domestically 
and internationally. First, again taking a look at China’s policies, this thesis analyzes 
changes over time to identify whether or not the Agreement has made broad impacts. If 
the changes are limited to the stipulations in the Agreement, the impact from the 
Agreement is narrow. If, however, Chinese policies aim at changing behavior further than 
just the stipulations, then the impact is broad. Second, this thesis examines other 
agreements made internationally that contain elements similar to Agreement. Propagation 
of similar cyber norms implies a broader impact resulting from the Agreement. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
In order to explore impacts of the Agreement, this thesis is divided into five 
chapters. Chapter II begins by broadening the analytical scope, looking at policies to 
determine whether cooperation has expanded beyond the Agreement in terms of either 
U.S.–China relations or broader global cyber activities. Chapter III then reexamines 
FireEye’s data and making a deeper inspection on the volume of cyberattacks. Chapter IV 
explores an alternative method of measuring cyberattacks, the Schmitt Analysis. Finally, 
Chapter V summarizes the findings, discusses policy-relevant implications and gives 
recommendations for further research. 
 
 22
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
23
II. THE U.S.-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT AND CHINESE
CYBER POLICY68 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the two years following the Agreement, few articles discuss Chinese 
compliance to their commitment outside the sheer volume of cyberattacks. Analysts 
generally focus on the volume of cyberattacks as the sole criteria in which to measure the 
results of the Agreement. As a result, the United States needs to expand analysis of the 
Agreement. Has the Agreement or effects of the Agreement resulted in broader impacts 
to Chinese cyber policies? This chapter explains that the actions taken by the Chinese 
government suggest the Agreement represents a sincere effort to honor the spirit of 
cyber-cooperation. 
Over the past two years, major changes in Chinese cyber policies and other 
related areas suggest that the Agreement influenced Chinese behavior outside of the 
specific stipulations. From the formation of new cyber laws and bilateral agreements to 
different language used in political rhetoric, the PRC’s position appears to be changing, 
which raises key questions. How much has and/or is the PRC’s cyber position changing 
and in what direction? This chapter attempts to answer both questions by analyzing 
China’s official and unofficial cyber policies and the U.S.-China relationship pre- and 
post-Agreement. It first revisits the terms and define the specific parameters of the 
Agreement. Then, it explores the pre- and post-Agreement eras, respectively. Last, it 
explains the findings and provides an interpretation of the data. 
This review in this chapter finds a discernable change in Chinese policies from 
the pre- to post-Agreement periods. During the pre-Agreement period, the PRC gave little 
focus and attention to official cyber policies, generally lacking any cybersecurity laws. 
Instead, the PRC’s cyber doctrine relied on an unofficial doctrine, showing a consistent 
effort by Chinese actors to engage in cyber theft and espionage. Additionally, the PRC’s 
efforts to engage in U.S.-China cyber relations seemed insincere bilateral talks failed to 
68Chapter II of this thesis was used as the final paper for NS4642 (Summer 2017) with Dr. Glosny. 
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generate changes in China such as formal or informal cooperation between U.S. and 
Chinese law enforcement agencies. In the post-Agreement period, however, concerted 
efforts by the CCP suggest a drastically different position. New cybersecurity laws and 
strategies show greater government involvement to regulate and manage cyberspace. 
Formal information sharing and cooperative mechanisms between U.S. and Chinese law 
enforcement that include exchanging phone numbers also suggest change at different 
levels including the bureaucratic level. In the end, the Agreement not only changed the 
volume of attacks, but also Chinese policies and governance of cyberspace. 
B. THE 2015 AGREEMENT 
In general, the United States and China reaching an agreement is a major 
historical moment. While not permanently binding, the language and specific stipulations 
in any agreement play major roles in shaping both countries’ relationship with each other 
as well as other nations. The formation of the 2015 U.S.-China Cyber Agreement will 
likely be no exception, but, as seen in previous agreements, the question is to what 
degree. As a result, defining what exactly each side agreed to is paramount to 
understanding how much of an impact the Agreement has made. Take, for example, the 
case of the 1982 Communique, where the CCP has criticized and still criticizes the 
United States for failing to uphold promises to reduce weapon sales to Taiwan. The 
impact was fairly narrow as U.S. promises did not expand to include military technology 
as well as other items. The United States must, then, identify the stipulations of the 
Agreement and defines what would constitute a broad versus narrow impact. 
1. Terms of the Agreement 
The terms and stipulations of the Agreement have never been made into a formal 
document. Instead, the terms were explained through three press releases following the 
2015 security summit between President Obama and President Xi. They presented the 
initial release in a joint press conference by the two presidents on September 25, 2015, 
which was later provided as a transcript by the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary. The 
second release, also from the U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, came in the form of a 
fact sheet that summarized the views exchanged between the two presidents. Last, the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC) also released a 
summary of outcomes from the summit. Appendix D provides the specific language from 
the three documents concerning the Agreement. 
Although both sides emphasize different items, there are several areas of overlap 
from which this thesis can derive the exact stipulations of the Agreement. In particular, 
nearly identical language can be seen in the White House’s “Fact Sheet” and the 
FMPRC’s “Outcome list.”69 Focusing on the overlapping language, the stipulations 
covered under the Agreement can be identified as the following: 
 
 Neither state will “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of 
intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business 
information for commercial advantage, with the intent of providing 
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors”70 
 Both states will work with other nations to promote and establish 
international rules and norms of conduct in cyberspace71 
 Both states will jointly fight cybercrime, including investigation assistance 
and information sharing72 
 Both states will establish a “high-level joint dialogue mechanism to fight 
cybercrime and related issues,” including:73 
 Establishment of a cyber hot-line 
 Mechanism to review timeliness and quality of responses to 
requests for information and assistance with respect to malicious 
cyber activity identified by either side 
 Minimum of two dialogue meetings per year  
 
Superficially, the terms of the Agreement are fairly straightforward. Both 
President Obama and President Xi identified an alarming trend moving their countries 
toward conflict and, as a result, cooperated to avoid entering a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
                                                 
69 “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States”; “Full Text: Outcome list 
of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States.” 
70 “Full Text: Outcome list of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States.”  
71 Ibid.  
72 “First U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues Summary of 
Outcomes.”  
73 “Full Text: Outcome list of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States.”  
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Furthermore, both sides agree that the problem is not just one between the United States 
and China but a global problem with far-reaching implications. Therefore, the two sides 
agree that, as the largest cyber power and largest cyber user base, respectively, the United 
States and China must lead the change in global cyber behavior. More notably, the two 
separate fact sheets released by each government contain nearly identical text with the 
only real difference being that the U.S. version states “the United States and China,” 
whereas the Chinese version states “China and the United States” or “both sides.” 
A deeper analysis of the terms, however, reveals that there are several ways to 
interpret compliance. More specifically, since none of the documents explain what 
compliance would look like, fulfilling the terms can vary greatly. As Wharton professor 
Marshall W. Meyer points out, implementation of the Agreement will be difficult because 
the language is “full of ambiguity. What’s the line between government and business? 
Also, especially in China, which government are we talking about?”74 These questions, 
among many others, highlight the importance of how each country interprets actual 
compliance, which, as a result, will vary the possible scale and scope of cooperation. 
Therefore, as a reflection of Chinese intentions, the focus must be on Chinese actions. 
2. Broad versus Narrow Impact 
Depending on Chinese actions, the results following the Agreement will either be 
broad or narrow, thus helping to determine Chinese intentions. Broader impacts are 
actions taken beyond the specific interpretations of the terms and narrow impacts are 
much more limited actions. For example, while both sides agree to jointly fight 
cybercrime, a narrow interpretation does not mean actual cooperation must occur as the 
Agreement does not specify or name which agencies will cooperate nor does it dictate 
what “government” must make any policy changes domestically.75 Conversely, outcomes 
suggesting a broader impact would be actions like an arrest of a Chinese citizen by 
Chinese law enforcement stemming from a U.S. investigation.  
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Thus, this thesis characterizes actions following the Agreement between two 
endpoints. In the case of a narrow impact, Chinese actions are limited, following a 
limited and literal interpretation of each stipulation. Complying with the first stipulation, 
for instance, actions show little to no change in behavior. Cyberattacks and theft of 
intellectual property could continue as the terms specify state involvement. Given that the 
CCP has consistently stated that the government has not played a role in any the 
cyberattacks they have been accused of, the CCP, then, has nothing to change. 
Additionally, cooperative efforts under the second through fourth stipulations do not 
necessitate any actual results. Since international law nor the Agreement include legal 
mechanisms such as a motion for discovery, China can choose not to share information 
and the United States cannot prove Chinese agencies did not respond in a timely manner. 
At the other end, however, it is possible that the overall results of the Agreement 
show a much broader impact. Expanding on the first stipulation, for example, the CCP 
could interpret the definition of “state-sponsored” to include efforts to prevent and punish 
government involvement rather than just not ordering cyber theft operations.76 
Imaginably, a change in government conduct could include sweeping policy changes like 
punishment for rogue PLA actors and regulations prohibiting the use of illegally obtained 
intellectual property. Likewise, cooperative actions could potentially include extradition 
agreements and/or the formation of an international joint task force akin to ones under 
Interpol. Consequently, going back to President Obama’s point of whether “words are 
followed by actions,” the United States must also ask to what degree.77 
3. Summary of the Agreement 
Overall, however, one can draw a few conclusions from the terms. First, the 
Agreement makes an attempt at drawing a line concerning the intent behind cyber 
espionage. President Obama and President Xi each make statements clarifying that cyber 
espionage for industrial/commercial theft is distinctly different from using cyber 
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espionage to support national security and/or other interests. Secondly, while neither side 
specifically states any punishment for violating these stipulations, they make a point to 
highlight the consequences if the two cease cooperative efforts. In particular, statements 
by President Xi succinctly point out “confrontation and friction are not made by choice 
for both sides,” emphasizing the idea that the two sides are trapped in a Prisoner’s 
dilemma with a negative end result that “confrontation will lead to losses on both 
sides.”78 Lastly, the ambiguity in the language of the text provides opportunities by either 
side to shape the scale and scope of the Agreement. The purpose of a cyberattack can 
often have multiple interpretations, particularly for dual-use technologies, and with loose 
standards of timeliness and quality of responses to malicious cyber activity, each side has 
ample ability to control how much cooperation will take place. In this sense, ambiguity 
provides an upside flexibility as circumstances evolve. Given the potential consequences, 
there is ample incentive to go beyond the minimal effort to uphold the Agreement.  
C. PRE-AGREEMENT ERA 
Prior to the Agreement, China’s cyber policy was not well defined as the CCP did 
not consider cyber policy as a separate entity. Instead, policies were developed as part of 
an overall “path to informatization” and as part of an overarching security policy.79 As a 
result, defining China’s cyber policy is complicated, requiring a holistic approach to 
comprehend. Thus, Section C and D, cover an array of documents and actions that 
provide context and help define China’s cyber policy. 
Section C is organized as follows. Part 1 examines official Chinese documents, 
revealing how the CCP perceived cybersecurity issues and policies. Next, Part 2 
discusses unofficial policy. As actions often speak louder than words, repeated incidents 
of cyber theft suggest China has an unofficial cyber policy that includes strategies such as 
espionage. Last, Part 3 details the U.S.-China relationship on cyberspace, providing an 
overview of cooperative and uncooperative efforts.  
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1. China’s Official Cyber Policies 
As described in a 2016 thesis by Vaughn Rogers, China’s cyber policy was 
primarily derived from two sources.80 The first source is the Information Office of the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China (SCIO). As part of the PRC’s State 
Council, the SCIO is tasked with disseminating “policies formulated by the Communist 
Party and laws passed by the National People’s Congress.”81 To support that goal, the 
SCIO releases White Papers which provide a description of both the official policy and 
overall purpose. The second source is The Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China.82 Like any other country, China’s Constitution defines the underpinnings and 
purpose of the PRC. As the primary sources for Chinese cyber policy, they were crucial 
for “how the Chinese government views the Internet and Internet use.”83 From these 
documents, one can draw a few conclusions.  
The Internet and its development, from China’s perspective, were paramount for 
China’s growth. As described in the 2010 White Paper, “The Internet in China,” demand 
for information would only continue to grow, thus the government must strived to 
provide people with access.84 Policy, therefore, focused on four items: “active use, 
scientific development, law-based administration and ensured security.”85 To that effort, 
from 1997–2009, the PRC invested “4.3 trillion yuan” into cyber infrastructure, which 
eventually led China to contain the largest number of Internet users in the world.86 Even 
so, the PRC recognizes there was still a disparity between urban and rural users as a 
                                                 
80 Vaughn C. Rogers, “The History of Chinese Cybersecurity: Current Effects on Chinese Society 
Economy, and Foreign Relations” (master’s thesis, Seton Hall Univeristy, 2016) 
http://scholarship.shu.edu/dissertations/2207. 
81 Susan V. Lawrence, China’s Political Institutions and Leaders in Charts (CRS Report No. R43303) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43303.pdf. 
82 “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” People’s Daily Online, accessed August 24, 
2017, http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html.  
83 Rogers, “The History of Chinese Cybersecurity,” 13. 
84 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China,” 
China.org.cn, accessed August 24, 2017, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm. 
85 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “The Internet in China.”   
86 Ibid.  
 30
result of imbalanced development, driving the PRC to focus on development. Overall, 
however, the recurring theme was a push toward growth and the Internet as an enabling 
pillar to that goal.  
While cyberspace as the pillar for growth was the primary goal, the PRC also 
recognized that addressing security threats was quickly becoming a goal of equal 
importance. In 2015, the White Paper, “China’s Military Strategy,” the SCIO explained 
China faces a crisis as both a competitor in an “international security competition” and as 
“one of the major victims of hacker attacks.”87 While the statement was likely a response 
to previous U.S. accusations including the 2015 indictment of five PLA Officers, 
previous documents showed consistent opposition to cyberattacks. The 2010 paper 
claimed that of the all the computers infected by the “Conficker virus,” China accounted 
for around 30% of the total.88 Thus, even much earlier than the Agreement, China’s 
official position has consistently been against cyberattacks. 
Furthermore, China also consistently maintained a policy of pursing development 
peacefully and to make a concerted effort toward international cooperation. Both in 
China’s Constitution and in the 2011 White Paper, “China’s Peaceful Development,” the 
PRC reiterated that China must “live up to international responsibility” and respect 
“others’ security concerns.”89 Hence, China’s cyber policy should be promising.  
Overall, PRC goals, in principle, matched the United States. The Internet is of the 
utmost importance. The government is charged with providing access and security to the 
public, while ensuring actions remain peaceful. Why, then, did so many cyberattacks 
occur? The problem was China’s unofficial policy and glaring holes in official policy. 
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2. China’s Unofficial Policies 
As detailed in several reports including official testimonies to the U.S. Congress, 
the reality has been that the Chinese government uses cyber espionage as an immensely 
effectively tool.90 One estimate in 2015 claimed China was “responsible for as much as 
80% of all intellectual property theft against U.S. companies.”91 Although many other 
reports, such as Akamai, showed significantly lower figures, China was consistently one 
of the largest perpetrators of cyberattacks.92 Even discounting information warfare 
operations between the United States and China, there was an apparent disconnect 
between official policy and reality. CCP policy may not have directly dictated or 
advocated cyberattacks, but, for the United States at least, attacks were the expectation. 
From the 2003 intrusion of DOD systems by Titan Rain to Operation Aurora in 2010 to 
the 2015 attack on the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), there appeared to be a 
consistent effort by Chinese actors to steal and spy from the United States.93  
Moreover, behind these efforts, there appeared to be an unofficial doctrine of how 
the Chinese operate. Similar to a corporate business plan, Chinese actions displayed a 
complete logistics cycle of “acquisition, absorption, and application.”94 As shown in 
Figure 3, there was, to some degree, a doctrinal model of operations. 
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Figure 3.  A Model of Espionage Effectiveness95 
While the model in Figure 3 is far from a detailed layout of operations, analysts have 
identified enough of a pattern in Chinese actions to frame a pseudo-doctrine of 
operations. More specifically, the authors of Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology 
Acquisition and Military Modernization dispelled several myths and provided details of 
Chinese industrial espionage.96 For example, in terms of acquisitions, analysts found 
widespread evidence of CCP programs that include “the use of open source, foreign R&D 
in China, PRC-based transfer organizations, U.S.-based facilitators, the role of overseas 
students and scholars, PRC policy initiatives, clandestine support for technology transfer, 
and China’s abuse of cyber space.”97 Moreover, evidence of these programs included 
empirical proof such as discovering that “Larry Wu-Tai Chin was paid ‘about a million 
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dollars’ by Chinese intelligence.”98 Overall, there is an identifiable process that can 
basically be called policy. 
Even accepting that not all of the actors were directly tied to the state, many of the 
non-state actors were such that they are better described as “‘partial state actors.”99 China 
utilized the complexity and relative uncertainty of attribution as a form of plausible 
deniability, but if one asks “‘cui bono?’, it is hard to reach any other conclusion than that 
their perpetrators were acting in the perceived interests of Beijing.”100 Much of the data 
stolen had little use for the private sector. Military technology, and OPM data, among 
other things, were not in much demand. Thus, following the laws of supply and demand, 
there must have been some level of demand for the market to function; actors must be 
incentivized to steal information. Assuming, of course, a rational actor model, either there 
was enough nationalism for the propagation of patriot actors or, perhaps more likely, 
some sort of compensation offered by the Chinese government such as potential 
employment or a monetary exchange. In either case, the CCP, directly or indirectly, 
seemed to have a policy that enables a market for cyber espionage. 
3. U.S.–China Relations in Cyberspace 
China’s official and unofficial policies complicated the U.S.-China relationship. 
Official policies stated that a rivalry is debilitating and, therefore, required a level of 
cooperative effort. As a result, in February 2012, President Xi and President Obama 
agreed to forge a “cooperative partnership.”101 Unofficially, however, Chinese actions 
seemed to test U.S. boundaries of what can be proven. Thus, against a backdrop of 
accusations and mistrust, from 2012 up until the Agreement, U.S.-China relations in 
cyberspace seemed insincere. 
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For the most part, China never seemed to take U.S. allegations of “official 
Chinese actors’ involvement in enabled-theft of intellectual property” seriously.102 
Instead, responses were limited to dismissing the allegations or claiming that China faces 
the same or greater level of attacks. Like most problems, the first step is simply to admit 
a problem exists, so, from the U.S. perspective, China’s unwillingness to admit a problem 
made it impossible to seek resolution.  
Even considering the bilateral groups and talks, words never turned into action. 
From establishment of a “Cyber Working Group (CWG)” in 2013 to its subsequent 
suspension in 2014, the two sides agreed to cooperate on issues, but never identified any 
exact areas of consensus or produced any mechanisms to enhance cooperative efforts.103 
The CWG, as a confidence-building tool, thus, was short-lived and relatively ineffective. 
Furthermore, 2009–2012 talks between the Cooperation in Cybersecurity China Institute 
of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) and Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) identified similar problems.104 Cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies is essentially non-existent, and the “U.S. will require some 
agreement to constrain proxies as part of any larger agreement or CICIR proposed Code 
of Conduct.”105 Thus, up until the Agreement, there seemed to be little recourse in fixing 
inherent problems to U.S.-China relations. 
D. POST-AGREEMENT 
Since the Agreement, cyber policy and cyber-related issues seem to “have grown 
in importance in relation to China’s strategic objectives including its economic, military 
and political interests.”106 Over the course of two years, the Chinese government made 
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several new agreements and passed a new cyber law. These developments show that the 
CCP post-Agreement is different from the CCP pre-Agreement. In sum, while far from 
definitive proof, China’s actions in the post-Agreement era suggest a notable change in 
CCP’s strategic calculus and goals. 
1. China’s Official Cyber Policies 
In contrast to the CCP’s pre-Agreement position, it seems that, following the 
Agreement, the CCP made a concerted effort to change official Chinese cyber policy. 
Over the last two years, the CCP modernized policies that now separate cyber policy into 
its own separate and distinct field. Unlike the pre-Agreement era where regulations of 
cyberspace were a subsidiary of other policies, three major policy developments in post-
Agreement China show that this is no longer the case. These developments are as 
follows: the National Cybersecurity Strategy, the International Cybersecurity Strategy, 
and the 2016 Cybersecurity Law.107  
The three developments in Chinese cyber policy are, for the most part, promising 
for U.S. interests. Collectively, the new policies imply that the CCP intends to be more 
involved in governing cyberspace and that these intentions are peaceful. With this new 
role, the CCP appears to be laying out the foundation of cyber policy aligned more 
closely with U.S. interests in three ways. One, the CCP is beginning to focus on 
establishing cyber laws and designing law enforcement mechanisms. Two, rather than 
deflecting responsibility, the CCP is taking an active role in shaping cyber culture. Last, 
the CCP is also taking further steps to cooperate internationally.  
Unlike the pre-Agreement era where cyber laws were relatively ambiguous, post-
Agreement China focused on “actual enforcement action.”108 Both the National and 
International Cybersecurity Strategies iterate the importance and applicability of a “rule-
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based order in cyberspace.”109 Then in conjunction, the 2016 Cybersecurity Law defines 
exactly what that order looks like and how to comply.110 For example, the law details 
network regulations on the collection of personal information as well as potential 
punishments for non-compliance.111 In comparison, these rules in pre-Agreement China 
were non-existent. Thus, one can infer that post-Agreement CCP takes cybersecurity and 
the regulation of cyberspace, at least to some degree, more seriously. Additionally, in the 
face of foreign attacks, the government is also responsible for deciding a proper 
response.112 Companies and other non-state entities, therefore, do not have free reign to 
retaliate, but, like similar U.S. counterparts, must rely on the government to make a 
decision. 
Furthermore, the changes in policy infer that the CCP plays a major role in 
shaping and dictating cyber norms. Domestically, the CCP now states that one of China’s 
strategic tenets must be to strengthen “the construction of online culture.”113 The 
government, as the CCP argues, needs to guide the Chinese people as to what is 
moral.114 As opposed to their earlier stance of a more hands-off approach, the new 
hands-on tenet marks a shift toward claiming responsibility. Given previous rhetoric that 
the CCP could hardly be at fault for rogue actors, a proactive effort to shape acceptable 
behavior in cyberspace is, at a minimum, more promising than reacting dismissively or 
hoping for a solution with a laissez-faire approach to governance. Even if one accepts the 
argument that the CCP was always involved with a policy of “e-democracy, i-
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dictatorship,” it was always unofficial.115 Until the post-Agreement era, there was simply 
an absence of any official statements and documents focused on how to govern 
cyberspace. Cyber policy now dictates official responsibility for both creating change and 
causing it. 
The final major area of promise is China’s role in cooperating internationally. 
While labeling pre-Agreement China as uncooperative may be a stretch, there was a 
notable absence of cooperative efforts internationally with regards to cyberspace. Years 
of U.S. accusations of cyber theft and espionage seemed to fall on deaf ears. Even 
discounting China as the perpetrator, one might expect the CCP to show some interests in 
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime as China is the “biggest victim of 
cybercrime.”116 Understandably, Article 32, which involves extraterritorial searches, 
presents a major concern and a potentially impossible barrier against Chinese interests 
and ideology, but the CCP neither participated in negotiating the treaty nor pursued an 
alternative option as they have done in other instances.117 
Thus, the principles and language under the new policies are somewhat of a 
surprise, showing a commitment toward cooperative efforts. The International 
Cybersecurity Strategy states that “international cyberspace governance should feature 
multi-party participation” to include multiple nations as well as an array of other 
organizations and that China will “support the international community to consolidate 
consensus and implement the outcomes.”118 Furthermore, Article 7 under the 2016 
Cybersecurity law states that the CCP will participate in “international exchange and 
cooperation in the areas of cyberspace.”119 The CCP not only signaled to international 
audiences of its commitment, but also passed official mechanisms in Chinese policy that 
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help ensure compliance. As a result, official policy seems less about appeasing an 
international audience and more about actually making changes. 
2. Unofficial Policy 
Unofficially, the primary question revolves around the reality of Chinese 
behavior. Do Chinese actions match their words? Although official policy may state that 
China will cooperate, historically, absence of any effort would suggest that unofficially, 
China changed very little. If, for example, a cybercriminal is identified and the CCP does 
nothing to investigate, one can infer that Chinese cyber policy is relatively permissive of 
such behavior. What this thesis shows, however, is that, to a large extent, Chinese actions 
comply with not just the terms of the Agreement, but also with the spirit of it. As detailed 
in Chapters III and IV, there has been a notable decline in cyberattacks. Even outside of 
cyberattacks, the data indicates a more cooperative and internationally-minded China. 
Several arrests over the last two years counter years of complaints that China 
rarely enforces or punishes malicious actors. In the week following the Agreement, the 
CCP immediately made a gesture of “good-faith” by arresting an unspecified number of 
hackers at the behest of the U.S. government.120 Then in December 2015, perhaps in 
conjunction with “China’s Global Law Enforcement Drive,” the United States saw a rare 
admission from the CCP that Chinese actors “were indeed responsible for compromising 
the security of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.”121  Although the admission 
fell short of admitting state-sponsored activities, the arrest of the five hackers is a 
concrete start toward proving a commitment toward the Agreement. Additionally, the 
arrests in 2017 of a criminal operation stealing and selling “private data of Apple users” 
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and of the “Fireball” malware developers show a continuous effort to punish malicious 
actors.122 While these arrests are far from the 15,000 arrested immediately prior to the 
Agreement, the pattern falls in line with U.S. expectations that “the proof that the 
cooperation really is improving” is seeing commitment “sustained over time.”123 
China’s pursuit of additional international agreements also suggests the CCP 
intends to make a continuous, cooperative effort. Currently, the CCP holds similar 
agreements against conducting “cyber espionage for commercial gain” with “the United 
States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the G-7 and G-20.”124 Rather than feigning 
cooperation, China appears to be attempting to establish a global norm against 
conducting economically motivated cyber espionage. While official policy does not go as 
far to state such is the goal, signing the myriad of international agreements suggests that 
is the case for China’s cyber policy unofficially.  
3. U.S.–China Relations in Cyberspace 
In terms of U.S.-China relations, sustained cooperative efforts by the CCP suggest 
a serious commitment toward “long-term Sino-American relations.”125 From their active 
participation in high-level working groups during the Obama Administration and 
recommitment under the Trump administration, the CCP has shown and is showing their 
cooperative efforts are robust and durable.126 Whereas the two states only held one 
                                                 
122 Samuel Gibbs, “Criminal Gang Arrested For Selling Apple Users’ Private Data In China,” The 
Guardian, June 9, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/09/apple-employees-arrested-
selling-private-user-data-china-criminal; Yi Shu Ng, “China Arrests Hackers Behind One Of The World’s 
Largest Malware Infections,” Mashable, July 26, 2017, http://mashable.com/2017/07/26/chinese-hackers-
arrested/#_8_MAq3ZSgqn. 
123 Ryan Rifai, “China Says Thousands Arrested For Online Crime,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2018, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/china-thousands-arrested-online-crime-150818192622887.html; 
Nakashima and Goldman, “In a first, Chinese hackers are arrested at the behest of the U.S. government.” 
124 Adam Segal, “The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now 
What?,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), June 29, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-cyber-
norms-united-nations-ends-deadlock-now-what. 
125 Gary Brown and Christopher D. Yung, “Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity Agreement, Part 
3,” The Diplomat, January 21, 2017,  http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-
cybersecurity-agreement-part-3/. 
126 Adam Segal, “Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty,” Hoover Institution, Aegis 
Series Paper, no. 1703, 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/segal_chinese_cyber_diplomacy.pdf, 15. 
 40
dialogue during the pre-Agreement era with little result, the U.S. and China not only held 
three high-level joint dialogues but managed to solidify actual cooperative mechanisms. 
Highlights of notable mechanisms are as follows: 
 Established “guidelines for requesting assistance on cybercrime or 
other malicious cyber activities and for responding to such 
requests”127 
 Conducted a 2016 tabletop exercise on “cybercrime, malicious 
cyber activity and network protection scenarios to increase mutual 
understanding regarding their respective authorities, processes 
and procedures,” in which “both sides will assess China’s 
proposal for a seminar on combatting terrorist misuse of 
technology and communications.”128 
 Established a hotline between the U.S. and Chinese presidents 
“for escalation of issues that may arise in the course of responding 
to cybercrime and other malicious cyber activities”129 
 Established regular meetings at the “ministerial level” to discuss 
network security130 
 Designed the mechanism of the “Status Report on U.S./China 
Cybercrime Cases”131 
 Formed the “first U.S.-China Senior Experts Group on 
International Norms in Cyberspace and Related Issues”132 
 
As shown, the working groups went above and beyond the specific terms of the 
Agreement, and have strengthened U.S.-China relations. Each of the mechanisms work as 
confidence building measures by finding areas of consensus and binding the two sides 
toward cooperation.  
                                                 
127 “First U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues Summary of 




130 “Second U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues High Level Joint Dialogue,” U.S. Department 
of Justice, June 14, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-us-china-cybercrime-and-related-issues-
high-level-joint-dialogue. 
131 “ Third U.S.-China High-Level Joint Dialogue on Cybercrime and Related Issues,” U.S. 
Department of Justice, December 8, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-us-china-high-level-joint-
dialogue-cybercrime-and-related-issues. 
132 “Second U.S.-China Cybercrime and Related Issues High Level Joint Dialogue.” 
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Although critics that might argue words still mean little without action, both sides 
executed their promises. In addition to the arrests and cooperative takedown of “some 
botnets and fake websites,” the two established a more efficient streamline of 
communication with “a point of contact and a designated email address.”133 Also, on 
May 11, 2016, the U.S. and China discussed international norms.134 While results are 
unclear, the group called the talks “positive, in-depth and constructive.”135 For the most 
part, actions are following words. The actions are perhaps slow for some and too little for 
others, but progressive nonetheless.136  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Agreement called only for each state not to engage in espionage for 
commercial economic gain and for the two sides to attempt to cooperate, but China has 
done more than that. The CCP made official legal changes. They passed the first 
comprehensive cyber law in Chinese history, the first national cybersecurity strategy, and 
the first international cybersecurity strategy. Furthermore, the CCP actually executed 
many of their promises. From continued meetings to actual arrests, the CCP is holding up 
its end of the bargain. Thus, from pre- to post-Agreement, there is a discernable, positive 
change in Chinese cyber policy. Moreover, Chinese cyber policies are more cooperative 
and more aligned with U.S. interests.  
Thus, U.S.-China cyber relations are better than they have ever been. In promises 
and in action, the two sides are talking, cooperating, and, more importantly, finding areas 
of agreement. Although none of this necessarily precludes the possibility of a continued 
adversarial relationship, these efforts do, at least, suggest the potential for an alternative 
relationship. China might be continuing to steal from the U.S. in massive quantities, or, 
                                                 
133 Segal, “Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty,” 15. 
134 “China, U.S. discuss int’l norms of state behavior in cyberspace,” Xinhua, May 12, 2016, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/12/c_135354264.htm. 
135 Mel Gechlik, “Appropriate Norms of State Behavior in Cyberspace: Governance in China and 
Opportunities for U.S. Businesses,” Hoover Institution, Aegis Series Paper, no. 1706, 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/gechlik_webreadypdf.pdf. 
136 Josh Chin, “Inside the Slow Workings of the U.S.-China Cybersecurity Agreement,” The Wall 
Street Journal (blog), June 15, 2016, https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/06/15/inside-the-slow-
workings-of-the-u-s-china-cybersecurity-agreement/. 
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as Adam Segal points out, the “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence;137 that 
part may or may not have changed. But overall, efforts and actions on the part of the CCP 
suggest an effort that extends past the stipulations. In other terms, the impact of the 
Agreement is broad, not narrow. 
 
 
                                                 
137 Adam Segal, “The U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Deal One Year Later,” Council on Foreign 
Relations (blog), September 28, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-cyber-espionage-deal-one-year-
later. 
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III. VOLUME OF ATTACKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I, this thesis briefly discussed the literature surrounding the changes in 
cyber trends following the 2015 U.S. China Cyber Agreement (Agreement). Analysts 
generally fell into one of three categories on how to see the results of the Agreement: 
optimistic, pessimistic, or uncertain. While offering their respective opinions, however, 
nearly every source cited the same FireEye report as their evidence and did not perform 
any deeper analysis into the data. Particularly given the reliance on FireEye’s data, one 
should expect derivative users would provide a more thorough analysis, however, none of 
the sources test or critically analyze FireEye’s data. How quickly are changes occurring? 
Are the changes stable from month-to-month? As a consequence, there could be 
significant holes in their findings and conclusions. Chapter III, thus, revisits the data to 
fill the gaps in analytical knowledge by using a wider range of sources and data would 
not significantly reduce the level of cyber espionage instances or damages. Additionally, 
Chapter III performs a more rigorous examination of the data, investigating the different 
rate of change from pre- and post-Agreement periods. Section II re-examines FireEye’s 
data and provides a more thorough investigation of their findings. Section III then 
analyzes data from Hackmageddon, a third-party source, to test against FireEye’s data. 
Last, Section IV discusses parallel trends through an examination of other, more 
qualitative, sources and data.  
In the end, this chapter finds that the results of the Agreement did not cause a 
decline in volume of attacks; however, it did play a significant role in accelerating and 
stabilizing change. The trend of a declining volume of cyberattacks began much earlier 
than the Agreement, suggesting other events, such as President Obama’s threat of 
sanctions, more accurately represent the cause for the change in Chinese behavior. As a 
result, the Agreement was likely not a watershed moment. The volume of attacks, 
however, declined at a greater rate and with less volatility in the post-Agreement period. 
Additionally, parallel trends partially refute other counter-arguments that claim increased 
sophistication of Chinese attacks account for the drop in volume. Consequently, the 
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lower, more consistent level of cyberattacks give reason to believe the Agreement was 
successful in changing Chinese behavior and for U.S.-China cyber relations to progress 
optimistically. 
B. FIREEYE 
As a starting point, it seems prudent to revisit and examine the data in FireEye’s 
report, “Redline Drawn.”138 FireEye claimed their data showed a “notable decline in 
China-based groups’ overall intrusion activity against entities in the U.S. and 25 other 
countries” that actually began in 2014, prior to the Agreement.139  As evidence, the 
group provided a graph showing a declining trend of attacks in “Active Network 
Compromises Conducted By 72 Suspected China-Based Groups By Month.”140  After a 
closer examination of their data, this chapter supports much of their same conclusions. 
Since the Agreement, there has been a positive and promising trend on Chinese behavior 
in cyberspace, but also much uncertainty. To echo the words of former Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper, the “jury is out.”141 
1. Data 
Three graphs follow. Figure 4 is the graph from in FireEye’s report. Figure 5 and 
6 are graphs recreated from data visually extrapolated from FireEye’s graph with Figure 
5 covering the complete timeline and Figure 6 covering from after the Agreement in 
September 2015. 
                                                 
138  FireEye, “Redline Drawn: China Recalculates its use of Cyber Espionage” (special report, 
FireEye, June 2016), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-
espionage.pdf.    
139 Ibid.  
140 FireEye, “Redline Drawn.”  
141 Michael E. O’Hanlon and James B. Steinberg, “The Trump-Xi summit: A Rocky Relationship 





Figure 4.  Active Network Compromises.142 
FireEye’s graph covers from February 2013 to May 2016. From Figure 4, one can 
see a trend in the decline of cyberattacks starting as early as two years prior to the 
Agreement. This trend, as FireEye and other analysts argue, is evidence that the 
Agreement is not a major achievement. The volume of attacks was already dropping, 
therefore making the Agreement costs China very little. Another view, however, is that 
the Agreement deepened Chinese commitments toward ceasing attacks. As backed by a 
major drop in attacks from July 2015 to September 2015, the data suggests that the 
Agreement, while not a cause for decline, made a significant impact itself by accelerating 
                                                 
142 FireEye, “Redline Drawn.”  
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change. These observations, however, are fairly speculative; the data can be examined 
more closely for more solid evidence. 
Figures 5 and 6 can be read as follows. The line in blue shows estimated numbers 
of the volume of attacks from FireEye’s report per month. The line in red displays the 
change in attacks from month to month; positive values indicate an increase in number of 
attacks whereas negative values indicate a drop. Furthermore, linear equations derived 
from each set of data display the overall trend for both the blue and red lines. Lastly, the 
equations provided display the linear equation and R-squared value for each line.143  
At a glance, no strong correlation or pattern appears from month to month. 
Visually, there are no consistent cyclical patterns of attacks increasing or falling. 
Increases in attacks and falls are neither linear nor consistently pace against a previous 
month. For instance, the only consistent stretch of drops was from August 2014 to 
December 2014; otherwise, drops and rises occurred intermittently. Additionally, each 
year from 2013–2015 had 4, 5, and 4 months of increased attacks, respectively. While 
these statistics show very little, however, a closer analysis of the data reveals far more. 
 
                                                 
143 A caveat, however, regarding the b-value, or intercept value:  the size of the intercept is displayed 
for the both linear equations, but neither play a role in this analysis. Rather, the focus is on the m-value, or 
slope coefficient, and R-squared value. 
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Figure 5.  FireEye’s Graph Recreated.144 
                                                 
144 Adapted from: FireEye, “Redline Drawn.”  
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Figure 6.  Data from the Agreement Forward.145 
                                                 
145 Adapted from FireEye, “Redline Drawn.”   
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2. Evidence of the Agreement Causing Change Beneficial to the United 
States 
The data, for the most part, paints a promising picture of the Agreement. First, 
looking at Figure 5, the decline in overall attacks is significant. The slope formula for the 
trend line is:  
0.0626 2665.8y x    
With an m-value of -0.0626, the monthly drop in attacks occurs at a rate around 
2.4, a rate fast enough to not be dismissed. For example, if the value had been closer to 
zero like -0.000626, the same result would take 100 times longer. Additionally, the trend 
line also shows a R-squared value of 0.8561. While a high value does not necessarily 
mean the derived linear function fits the data perfectly, it does suggest a moderate degree 
of confidence that the trend line, overall, accurately represents the data.  
Secondly, the derivative function of Figure 6 also shows there is a relatively and 
increasingly consistent trend in the decline of attacks. The slope formula for this function 
is: 
0.0121 514.24y x   
Unlike the previous m-value, this figure is closer to zero, which in this case is 
promising for the United States. Since the value is small, the rate of change, or variance 
from month to month, is consistent. If the value was large, than making a predictive 
analysis becomes increasingly difficult as the rate of change would be inconsistent. 
Instead, that value is small, which coupled with an overall negative m-value represents a 
consistent drop in the number of attacks. 
Third, while the data in Figure 7 validates FireEye’s earlier claim that the 
Agreement is simply part of sweeping changes in Chinese behavior, the data also 
suggests the Agreement played a significant part in itself.   
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Figure 7.  Pre-agreement Volume of Attacks.146 
Up until the Agreement, the rate of decline was -0.0479. Comparatively, the rate 
following the Agreement was -0.0175, thus continuing a declining trend of the volume of 
attacks. While a smaller rate of change, -0.0175 vs -0.0479, the relative drop is much 
larger. Taking a nine-month difference from December 2014 to August 2015, there was a 
drop from 35 to 15 attacks and from September 2015 to May 2016, there was a drop from 
10 to 3 attacks. In absolute numbers, the drop was much larger prior to the Agreement. 
However, in terms of ratio, 35:15 is a 2.3:1 ratio, whereas 10:3 is a 3.3:1 ratio, which, in 
sum, means the drop in attacks is falling faster than prior to the Agreement. Or, in terms 
of percentage, drops of 57% and 70% respectively. Therefore, it seems that though China 
likely made the Agreement with a decline of attacks already taking place, this data 
suggests that the Agreement also provided positive U.S. feedback to bolster a change in 
Chinese behavior.  
Lastly, data shows there is an increasing level of consistency that occurs most 
notably in September 2015, the same month as the Agreement. Table 1, Column 2 
provides a five-month rolling standard deviation in attacks. Column 3 then provides a 
five-period rolling average of the standard deviation. 
                                                 
146 Adapted from FireEye, “Redline Drawn.” 
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Table 1.   Five-Month Rolling Standard Deviation.147 
Std. Dev. Avg 
02/13 24.07615 
03/13 2.160247 9.724692 
04/13 7.25718 6.479176 
05/13 7.494442 7.856731 
06/13 7.635444 8.272913 
07/13 7.848567 7.48583 
08/13 9.04802 6.636974 
09/13 9.338094 6.971992 
10/13 3.559026 7.120618 
11/13 3.391165 7.21123 
12/13 9.523655 8.442618 
01/14 9.791152 9.763051 
02/14 9.791152 9.976496 
03/14 9.715966 8.766597 
04/14 9.993331 8.202162 
05/14 10.59088 8.1832 
06/14 3.741657 7.917354 
07/14 6.968979 7.558346 
08/14 9.621157 8.120993 
09/14 8.664102 7.581988 
10/14 8.795832 6.496804 
11/14 6.554896 5.616431 
12/14 4.273952 4.709712 
01/15 4.195235 5.199843 
02/15 4.262237 6.567364 
03/15 4.262237 8.418794 
04/15 9.005554 10.34267 
05/15 11.11156 11.82146 
06/15 13.45239 10.79409 
07/15 13.88164 9.021963 
08/15 11.65619 6.607167 
09/15 3.868678 4.131948 
10/15 2.250926 2.066543 
11/15 1.378405 1.616009 
12/15 1.505545 1.40437 





                                                 
147 Derived from:  FireEye, “Redline Drawn.”   
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As shown in Table 1, prior to the Agreement, there was a high amount of 
variation between the numbers of attacks. With standard deviation values ranging around 
3 to 24, it was difficult to predict how much attacks would rise or fall. One month could 
see a drop of 10 attacks or an increase of 3 or vice versa. Since the months alternate 
between increases and decreases in numbers, variation paints a picture of inconsistency 
and unpredictability from month to month. After September 2015, however, variance 
takes a sharp dive. From the Agreement forward, variance remains sub-4.0 and averages 
around ~2.0. As a result, cyberattacks per month are more consistent and predictable 
since the Agreement. 
Overall, the data confirms two things. One, there is enough evidence to suggest 
the drop in attacks is not just a knee-jerk reaction by China, but a consistent outcome. 
Two, the impact of the Agreement, while not necessarily a cause for the decline, does 
show promise in stabilizing the low volume of attacks, thereby aiding in confidence to 
predict the volume of attacks staying low in the future. 
3. Uncertainty in the Data and Analysis 
While promising, however, the data does still suggest a degree of uncertainty. In 
Figure 5, the red line’s slope coefficient is small, showing a consistent trend, and the R-
squared value is also small. This means the correlation between the line and actual data 
points is also low. In other words, while the slope equation provides an overall trend, it 
does not accurately represent the data from point to point. For example, if one month was 
-10 and the following month was +10, the m-value would be zero. Overall, there is no 
change, but, from month to month, there are major swings. Comparatively, if one month 
was -1 and the following month was +1, the m-value is also zero. The m-value, while a 
good measurement of the overall trend, does not provide a metric for variance. 
Additionally, the same can be said for Functions 3 and 4. All three functions have an R-
squared value >.500, indicating a high degree of variance. In sum, while the trend is 
downward sloping, the large swings in attacks from month to month also mean the trend 
could quickly reverse. 
Furthermore, Function 4 displays a positive trend line and a positive m-value of 
0.0121. This means there is a slowdown in the drop of attacks with the possibility of a 
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reverse trend, a rise in attacks. Therefore, given the timeline’s parameters are only from 
the Agreement on, the data suggests the Agreement may not have the continuous effect of 
lowering the volume of attacks from its current level. 
Despite the variation and room for uncertainty, however, the strength of the data 
still favors a positive and promising impact. Even with R-squared values under 0.500 and 
a possible slowdown in the drop in the volume of attacks, the deep dive into FireEye’s 
data still shows a promising trend rather than an increase in volume or return to previous 
levels. 
C. HACKMAGEDDON 
Given such promise, one would also expect an impact on global trends as China is 
often referenced as the largest perpetrators of cyberattacks. This presumption, however, is 
not a well-established fact. In 2012, Akamai’s quarterly “State of the Internet” report 
sparked public fear as China accounted for more and more of the “world’s computer-
attack traffic,” ending the year with 41% of the global total.148 Other critics, including 
the Chinese Defense Ministry, dispute these claims and instead argue the United States is 
the top actor.149 Neither side, however, offers compelling or definitive evidence to prove 
their point.  
While exact numbers or even solid estimates on which nations or countries are the 
largest perpetrator of cybercrimes do not exist, there are some consistent themes. The 
United States, China, and Russia generally head the list of source countries as seen in 
                                                 
148 Mark Milian and Jordan Robertson, “China-Based Cyber Attacks Rise at Meteoric Pace,” 
Bloomberg, April 23, 2013, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-
23/china-based-cyber-attacks-rise-at-meteoric-pace.html. 
149 “The Us Government Might Be The Biggest Hacker In The World,” Reuters, last edited May 12, 
2013, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www.rt.com/usa/us-hacking-exploits-millions-104/; “Hackers R U: 
China Ranks Us As Top Source Of Cyber Attacks This Year,” last edited March 10, 2013, accessed August 
21, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/china-blames-us-hacking-051/. 
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reports by Symantec, Norse, McAfee, TrendMicro, and Akamai.150 Almost every report 
identified each of the three countries are as a major actor, whether the attack was DDOS, 
botnet, or other form. Thus, the forthcoming analysis assumes China plays a significant 
part in terms of global attack numbers. In that case, if China-based cyberattacks are 
indeed on a major decline, then cyberattacks on a global trend should also show an 
impact, even if it does not also show a decline.  
On the other hand, this analysis assumes that the level of attacks is relatively 
consistent. Expecting a change in the level of global cyberattacks if China’s behavior has 
changed makes the assumption that other actors’ behavior remains within expectations. It 
is possible, however, that other countries underwent significant changes themselves, 
potentially offsetting any changes by China. If Chinese attacks dropped by 20, an 
aggregate increase from other countries could have offset China’s decrease globally. 
Conversely, if Chinese attacks increased by 20, an aggregate decrease would explain the 
limited net change.  
Thus, it is possible that a void left by a decline in attacks by China could be filled 
by other actors. For example, in the case of fishing in the United States, setting limits on 
catching fish often resulted in overall increases.151 Fisherman who normally caught 
below the limit were seemingly incentivized to catch their daily limits. Thus, by using a 
similar logic, other actors could, plausibly, increase cyber activities in ways that counter-
balance China’s restraint. For the most part, however, what the data shows is paralleling 
behavior in the opposite direction: as the volume of cyberattacks by Chinese actors rose, 
the volume of cyberattacks by other actors also rose. This general correlation does not 
necessarily mean some states are following other states’ lead, but simply that the trend 
                                                 
150 “Global Perspective,” Norse, December 12, 2015, accessed August 21, 2017, 
http://www.norsecorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/December-2015-global-stats.pdf; “The 
Geographical Distribution Of Cybercrime,” Europol, accessed August 21, 2017, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/iocta/2015/distribution.html; Red24, “Cybercrime Top 10 Countries Where 
Attacks Originate,” British Bankers’ Association, accessed August 21, 2017, https://www.bba.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/red24+Cybercrime+Top+10+countries+where+attacks+originate+-++2015.pdf; 
Akamai, “State of the Internet/Security: Q2 2017 Report,” Akamai 4, no. 2 (2017), 
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-Internet/q2-2017-state-of-the-Internet-
security-report.pdf. 
151 Donald Leal, “Saving Fisheries with Free Markets,” The Milken Institute, February 2006, 
http://www.relooney.com/NS3040/0_New_824.pdf. 
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for individual countries generally parallels global trends as well. Furthermore, although 
the evidence is far from suggesting that other states may follow more restrained Chinese 
behavior, at the very least other states are unlikely to react to a drop in Chinese attacks by 
increasing their own attacks solely for that reason. 
Data from Hackmageddon, however, throws an interesting wrench into that 
parallel line of thinking. Section III explains overall cyberattack data shows little change 
and little consistency since 2014, thus making the results even harder to interpret. 
1. Data 
Since 2011, Paolo Passeri, founder of Hackmageddon and a Consulting Systems 
Engineer Security for OpenDNS, has kept a running log of cyberattacks. Although 
unverified, his blog offers the only open-source archive of cyber-attack data, and so 
offers a measurable source of intelligence. And although the data is global, it can be 
utilized to extrapolate a level of confidence as to whether cyberattacks from China have 
fallen enough to impact global numbers.152 
The following graphs, similar to the methods used with FireEye’s data, show 
monthly attack data along with the associated derivative function and regression lines. 
Figure 8 is the data broken down from Passeri. The combination of Passeri’s data into a 
single data set is displayed in Figure 9. Passeri’s data is further broken down by year in 
Figures 10, 11, 12. Last, Passeri’s data is split into two periods, pre- and post-Agreement, 
in Figures 13 and 14.  
                                                 
152 The following analysis assumes cyberattacks from the rest of the world are constant. This 
assumption, if unlikely, is neutral:  deviations in either direction would have opposite implications for the 
analysis. For example, if cyberattacks from the rest of the word increased in this time period, then the 
following analysis will actually underestimate the impact of decline in attacks from China.   
56 
 
Figure 8.  Number of Attacks from 2014–2016.153 
                                                 




Figure 9.  Volume of Attacks from Jan 2014 - Dec 2016.154 
                                                 
154 Adapted from: Passeri, “2016 Cyber Attack Statistics.”  
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Figure 10.  Volume of Attacks in 2014155 
                                                 
155 Adapted from Passeri, “2016 Cyber Attack Statistics.” 
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Figure 11.  Volume of Attacks in 2015156 
                                                 
156 Adapted from Passeri, “2016 Cyber Attack Statistics.” 
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Figure 12.  Volume of Attacks in 2016.157 
                                                 
157 Adapted from Passeri, “2016 Cyber Attack Statistics.” 
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Figure 13.  Pre-agreement Volume of Attacks.158 
                                                 
158 Adapted from Passeri, “2015 Cyber Attack Statistics.”  
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Figure 14.  Post-agreement Volume of Attacks.159 
 
                                                 
159 Adapted from Passeri, “2015 Cyber Attack Statistics.”   
63 
2. Evidence of the Agreement Causing Change Beneficial to the United 
States 
Similar to FireEye, data from Hackmageddon does provide some promising 
results. Comparing the pre- and post-Agreement periods, the rate of change in is 
decreasing. Prior to the Agreement, the volume of attacks increased at a rate of 0.0236 
compared to 0.0017 in the period following. In other words, the rate was seven times 
lower post-Agreement. Thus, the data suggests a potential change in behavior following 
the Agreement.  
Furthermore, in support of the judgment that the Agreement has had an impact, 
there also appears to be a significant shift from the year to year trend overall. In 2014, the 
mean level of attack per month was 73.33. In 2015, the mean was 84.75, and in 2016, the 
mean was 88.5. Thus, the global monthly mean volume of attack from 2014 to 2015 rose 
by 16%, but only by 4% from 2015 to 2016. However, because the data is derived from 
global cyberattacks and not broken out by Chinese attacks specifically, the impact is 
relative to China’s proportion of total attacks. Then, assuming that the behavior of the 
rest of the world is constant, then these data support a conclusion that Chinese behavior 
has changed following the Agreement.  
While this data also supports FireEye’s conclusion that the Agreement is less of a 
watershed moment as the drop in attacks starts before the Agreement, there is still some 
evidence the Agreement made an impact, given earlier caveats. If, as some critics argue, 
the drop in attacks occurs only following punitive actions, there is little explanation as to 
why the rate of drops increases in 2016 given 2016’s absence of punitive actions. 
3. Uncertainty in the Data and Analysis 
Again, similar to FireEye, data from Hackmageddon provides several 
conundrums. First, on one side, if one accepts several assumptions—that China is one of 
the largest perpetrators of cyberattacks, that the volume of Chinese cyberattacks declined 
significantly, and that the volume of attacks from the rest of the world remained constant 
– then one would also expect global changes to reflect the changes in Chinese behavior in 
diluted form. Instead, however, global trends seem to be unaffected. Overall, the m-value 
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is relatively small, 0.0171, indicating there has been little change in the volume of attacks 
from 2014–2017. This could indicate that the behavior of the rest of the world was not 
constant, or that the Chinese share of the global volume was relatively smaller. Or it 
could mean that the Hackmageddon data indicate different Chinese behavior than the 
FireEye data.  
More importantly, however, there is a much larger conclusion one can extrapolate 
from the data: uncertainty. As discussed previously, a low R-squared value is indicative 
of high variance, therefore low confidence in the trend. In all of the figures, the R-
squared value is miniscule. With values all far below .500, the respective trend lines do 
not accurately represent the data. It appears that, the broader the category, the less 
accurate the data. Therefore, while FireEye’s data has some measure of reliability, 
measuring volume of attacks on a global scale is not an entirely reliable way of 
measuring the Agreement’s impacts.  
D. PARALLEL TRENDS 
Although the data on volume of cyberattacks is fairly limited, alternative data sets 
suggest that there are parallel trends of a change in Chinese behavior. This section 
discusses the alternative data sets in two parts. First, it examines the periodic reports by 
cybersecurity firms. Although they do not necessarily provide quantitative metrics, 
qualitative statements from each report provide a basic understanding of the cyber 
environment over time. Second, also covered in these reports are observations of the 
techniques used by suspected Chinese actors from which one can derive potential trends 
in sophistication. 
1. Data 
Other than FireEye and Hackmageddon, only few sources provide open source 
data detailing the volume of cyberattacks and even fewer sources track where attacks 
originate and/or their destinations. Providing a list of resources, Rita Tehan’s CRS report 
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lists an extensive table of sources that keep track of cyber incidents and breaches.160 
Many of these sources, like Arbor Network’s Digital Attack Map, provide “real-time 
visualization and map of cyberattacks.”161 Honeynet Project’s Honeymap, similarily, 
also provides a real-time map of cyberattacks around the world. Neither, however, retain 
a historical database of attacks, only data in real time.  
Despite their limitations, these sources do provide valuable information. First, 
while far from definitive proof, the sources generally reaffirm FireEye’s conclusion. 
Symantec’s 2017 “Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR)” states, “detections of Chinese 
espionage malware dropped considerably following a mutual agreement with the U.S. to 
not target intellectual property.”162 Their report came eighteen months (Sept 2015 – Apr 
2017) after the Agreement but makes the same conclusion. While the report does not 
provide specific numbers, the authors do state confidence in their results, claiming there 
is “strong evidence that there has been a marked decline in activity by groups probably 
associated with China since the agreement was signed.”163 Furthermore, in a testimony 
to the USCC, James A. Lewis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) adds on, “China appears to be living up to its commitments under the Obama-Xi 
agreement.”164 While the statement lacks specific details, both Symantec and Mr. Lewis 
assert definite opinions that Chinese cyber-espionage has decreased since the Agreement.   
Furthermore, CrowdStrike, a rival competitor to FireEye, reversed their 2015 
position and instead, now confirm that there is a decline in volume of attacks. In October 
2015, Dmitri Alperovitch, Chief Technology Officer for CrowdStrike, provided a public 
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report of the company’s observations following the Agreement.165 While falling short of 
claiming the Agreement as a failure, he provided evidence of ongoing cyberattacks from 
a “variety of different Chinese actors,” which others have taken as signs of continued 
behavior.166 Since then, however, Mr. Alperovitch’s views have reversed. In response to 
President Obama’s claim that “we have witnessed Chinese economic cyber espionage 
reduced but not eliminated,” Alperovitch replied, CrowdStrike “confirms that 
finding.”167 He even goes as far to call the changes in China’s behavior as “the biggest 
success we’ve had in this arena in 30 years.”168 
In addition, other nay-sayers, like McAfee, while predicting cyber-espionage 
attacks “would increase in frequency,” seem to ignore their own data.169 McAfee cites 
the “Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report” as their source of intelligence. 
McAfee’s 2016 report, referencing Verizon’s 2015 data, predicts an increase of attacks 
but are unsure if the numbers will breach 2014’s levels of 548.170 Verizon, however, 
reported 2015 and 2016 numbers of 247 and 328, respectively.171 While a modest 
increase from 2015 to 2016, these numbers fall far short of 2014’s level. In other words, 
the pessimists have insufficient and questionable evidence to back their position. 
In sum, most of the sources support FireEye’s conclusion and the ones that do not 
either lack evidence or ignore the numbers they themselves cite. Symantec and Mr. Lewis 
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both affirm China’s adherence to the Agreement. CrowdStrike, in a reversal of position, 
now affirms the same. Plus, given another year of data, skeptics have yet to provide 
counter-evidence or take a position claiming an increase in attacks, choosing, instead, to 
simply refute positive positions without taking any a stance of their own. The data, 
however, provides far more evidence to be cautiously optimistic, rather than pessimistic. 
2. Sophistication 
Several analysts in 2015, including FireEye and McAfee, claimed attacks from 
Chinese actors would trend toward becoming stealthier and more sophisticated.172 In the 
year since their claims, however, the data suggests the opposite. Observed attacks have 
yet to show signs of increased capability in techniques or methodology. Furthermore, 
defensive capabilities like digital forensics and the number of sensors have improved, 
bolstering detection capabilities as well. 
FireEye has tracked the China-based group, APT3 (also known as Gothic Panda, 
UPS Team, and TG-0110), since 2014.173 APT3, according to FireEye, “is one of the 
more sophisticated threat groups” and is identifiable given the following 
characteristics.174 The group targets the following industries: Aerospace and Defense, 
Construction and Engineering, High Tech Telecommunications, and Transportation.175 
Their techniques include using zero-day exploits, phishing emails, and exploits in Adobe 
Flash. More specifically, the group is known to use the payload 
“Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi).”176 If China, as some argue, successfully 
centralized their cyber force and now use more sophisticated techniques, one would 
expect to see a change in methodology.  
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In a 2016 update by Symantec, however, APT3 changed very little. The report, 
“Buckeye Cyberespionage Group Shifts Gaze from U.S. to Hong Kong,” APT3 continues 
to use the same techniques.177 The group has not used new zero-day exploits, instead 
relies on “vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Flash.”178  Use of zero-day exploits, 
along with other techniques which will be discussed later, is a key indicator of the level 
of sophistication a cyber actor possesses. Since APT3 shows little progress in this arena, 
recent data suggests the group has not improved. In addition, relying on older 
vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer and Flash also suggest APT3 has not adapted beyond 
detection, but rather may be lagging behind. Internet Explorer and Adobe Flash are rarely 
used today. Most estimates today show only 3–13% of all browser usage as Internet 
Explorer and less than 10% of all website use Flash.179 The market share in either 
software is rapidly declining, severely limiting the effectiveness of APT3 efforts. 
Moreover, APT3 also continues to use the same remote access tool (RAT), Pirpi.180 
APT3 has not progressed into a more sophisticated actor, but rather shows signs of 
stagnation. 
Even taking into consideration APT10, improvements may not be as large as they 
seem. APT10, or MenuPass Group, is another Chinese cyber espionage group identified 
by FireEye.181 Unlike APT3, however, the group shows signs of improvement by 
adopting new tools, notably HAYMAKER, BUGJUICE, SNUGRIDE, and 
                                                 
177 Symantec, “Buckeye Cyberespionage Group Shifts Gaze from U.S. to Hong Kong,” September 6, 
2016, https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong. 
178 Ibid. 
179 “Usage of Flash for websites,” W3Techs, accessed November 09, 2017, 
https://w3techs.com/technologies/details/cp-flash/all/all; “Browser market share,” NetMarketShare , 
accessed November 09, 2017, https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-
share.aspx?qprid=2&qpcustomd=0; “Web Browser Market Share,” W3Counter: Global Web Stats, 
accessed November 09, 2017, https://www.w3counter.com/globalstats.php; Felix Richter, “Infographic: 
The Web Is Turning Its Back on Flash,” Statista Infographics, December 12, 2016, accessed November 09, 
2017, https://www.statista.com/chart/3796/websites-using-flash/.  
180 Symantec, “Buckeye Cyberespionage Group Shifts Gaze from U.S. to Hong Kong,” September 6, 
2016, https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong. 
181 “APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding 
Threat,” FireEye, April 6, 2017, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-
research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html. 
69 
QUASARRAT.182 While the signs point toward improvement, the use of QUASARRAT 
suggests that APT10 has not progressed beyond depending on other coders. Upper tier 
groups with sophisticated techniques generally do not rely on using scripts made by 
outside entities. Less capable actors, like script kiddies, on the other hand, do rely on 
open-source scripts as a springboard to enable their activities. As mentioned earlier, zero-
day exploits are key indicators of a sophisticated actor because they are basically 
unknown to all except the threat actor, making the exploits very effective. Avoiding the 
use of open-source scripts acts on the same principle. Since QUASARRAT is known, it is 
identifiable, thus more easily preventable and/or detectable. As a result, reliance on 
QUASARRAT suggests APT10 does not have the in-house knowledge of exploiting 
.NET framework, instead limited to creating custom tools that exploit HTTP. 
E. CONCLUSION 
After closer inspection of the data provided by FireEye and Hackmageddon, it 
appears that the Agreement was not a watershed moment. FireEye’s data indicates that 
the volume of Chinese cyberattacks was declining prior to the Agreement, suggesting 
Chinese behavior was likely altered due to prior events such as President Obama’s 
implication of sanctions and the U.S. Justice Department’s indictment of PLA Officers. 
Hackmageddon’s data also showed that there was not a significant change in global 
cyberattacks following the Agreement. Therefore, one can conclude that the Agreement 
did not likely reverse Chinese behavior. 
Although the Agreement appears to be part of a larger change in Chinese 
behavior, however, the Agreement did seem to play a part in accelerating change. 
FireEye’s data showed that attacks fell more quickly following the Agreement and 
remained more consistent from month to month, suggesting the CCP is controlling their 
cyber force in a direction positive for the United States. This positive trend is also 
reflected globally as the number of attacks is rising less swiftly.  
Furthermore, parallel trends help to address some of the potential counter-
arguments. One, although FireEye and Hackmageddon offer the only quantitative data 
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sets, thus making the analysis subject to a source bias, other sources’ qualitative data 
support similar findings. The volume of cyberattacks is falling, not rising. Two, early 
analysis of continued Chinese intrusions seems to be mistaken; most notably, 
CrowdStrike changed positions from stating Chinese cyberattacks were ongoing to 
confirming observations of a drop in suspected Chinese-based intrusions. Last, current 
trends do not support claims of China moving toward a Russian model. Instead, Chinese 
actors seem to utilize similar TTP, thus dispelling some of those fears. 
In sum, the Agreement did not cause a reverse in China’s behavior, but likely 
helped accelerate China’s commitment toward cooperating with U.S. goals of stemming 
the problem of China’s cyberattacks. A lower, more consistent baseline of cyberattacks 
from China will be harder to ignore in future talks. If the volume of Chinese cyberattacks 
returns to previous levels, the U.S. can use post-Agreement levels as leverage for what 
can be considered normal levels, which, as will be discussed in Chapter V, may have 




IV. SCHMITT ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III, this thesis reviewed FireEye’s data, which is the main data 
available, and found a positive correlation between a drop in the number of attacks and 
the Agreement. Further analysis of the data suggests that China’s behavior has greater 
correlation to the Agreement than what some analysts have previously argued. Despite 
such evidence, however, focusing solely on the number attacks remains a limited way of 
examining cyberattacks. As some critics argue, a decreased number of attacks does not 
necessarily mean the damage is any less. A change in China’s efforts, for instance, could 
potentially direct attacks more effectively, thereby increasing efficiency while reducing 
the volume of attacks. In order to gain a more complete perspective, Chapter IV, 
therefore, in order to explore those arguments, utilizes and repurposes a different set of 
criteria, the Schmitt Analysis, a framework designed to assess whether a particular 
cyberattack justifies the use of force. First, the chapter explains the Schmitt Analysis and 
its purpose. Section III, then, explains how the Schmitt Analysis can be repurposed, 
defining the methodology and data sets. Section IV analyzes the data based on the 
Schmitt Analysis. Last, Section V explains the overall findings. 
Ultimately, this chapter finds results similar to Chapter III: the Agreement was 
not a watershed moment, but an indicator of progress. Although the volume of attacks is 
important, other factors, including severity of the damage inflicted, also hold significant 
weight. This chapter’s adaptation of the Schmitt Analysis shows that the severity of 
attacks is also falling. Furthermore, rather than a rise in sophistication, the United States 
is now better able to attribute Chinese actors to a cybercrime. While the results also show 
these trends emerging prior to the Agreement, the continuing results suggest real change 
in Chinese behavior. 
B. SCHMITT ANALYSIS 
Michael Schmitt, a scholar on international law, recognized the inadequacy of 
current methods of evaluating cyberattacks for applying international law and proposed a 
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potential alternative. In particular, his 1999 article exploring the jus ad bellum of 
cyberattacks highlighted the problematic nature of computer network attacks (CNA).183 
Specifically, he noted that international law lacked an adequate mechanism for which to 
weigh cyberattacks, particularly because the definition of force was rather ambiguous.184 
As a consequence, Schmitt found the UN Charter definition inadequate, questioning 
whether the definition of force specifically means armed force or whether coercive efforts 
also count. He reasoned that a universal definition may be “impossible to resolve,”185 
and, as a result, he proposed an alternative analysis that transcended the debate 
altogether.   
1. Criteria 
Schmitt expands the evaluation of cyberattacks by looking at seven factors. He 
explained that these factors could help states assess “whether particular cyber operations 
amounted to a use of force.”186  The criteria are as follows: severity, immediacy, 
directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and responsibility.187 
Schmitt’s description of each criterion follows:  
(1) Severity: Consequences involving physical harm to individuals or 
property will alone amount to a use of force. Those generating only minor 
inconvenience or irritation will never do so. Between the extremes, the 
more consequences impinge on critical national interests, the more they 
will contribute to the depiction of a cyber operation as a use of force. In 
this regard, the scale, scope and duration of the consequences will have 
great bearing on the appraisal of their severity. Severity is self-evidently 
the most significant factor in the analysis.  
(2) Immediacy: The sooner consequences manifest, the less opportunity 
States have to seek peaceful accommodation of a dispute or to otherwise 
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forestall their harmful effects. Therefore, States harbor a greater concern 
about immediate consequences than those which are delayed or build 
slowly over time.  
(3) Directness: The greater the attenuation between the initial act and the 
resulting consequences, the less likely States will be to deem the actor 
responsible for violating the prohibition on the use of force. Whereas the 
immediacy factor focused on the temporal aspect of the consequences in 
question, directness examines the chain of causation. For instance, the 
eventual consequences of economic coercion (economic downturn) are 
determined by market forces, access to markets, and so forth. The causal 
connection between the initial acts and their effects tends to be indirect. In 
armed actions, by contrast, cause and effect are closely related—an 
explosion, for example, directly harms people or objects.  
(4) Invasiveness: The more secure a targeted system, the greater the 
concern as to its penetration. By way of illustration, economic coercion 
may involve no intrusion at all (trade with the target state is simply cut 
off), whereas in combat the forces of one State cross into another in 
violation of its sovereignty. The former is undeniably not a use of force, 
whereas the latter always qualifies as such (absent legal justification, such 
as evacuation of nationals abroad during times of unrest). In the cyber 
context, this factor must be cautiously applied. In particular, cyber 
exploitation is a pervasive tool of modern espionage. Although highly 
invasive, espionage does not constitute a use of force (or armed attack) 
under international law absent a nonconsensual physical penetration of the 
target-State’s territory, as in the case of a warship or military aircraft 
which collects intelligence from within its territorial sea or airspace. Thus, 
actions such as disabling cyber security mechanisms to monitor keystrokes 
would, despite their invasiveness, be unlikely to be seen as a use of force.  
(5) Measurability: The more quantifiable and identifiable a set of 
consequences, the more a State’s interest will be deemed to have been 
affected. On the one hand, international law does not view economic 
coercion as a use of force even though it may cause significant suffering. 
On the other, a military attack which causes only a limited degree of 
destruction clearly qualifies. It is difficult to identify or quantify the harm 
caused by the former (e.g., economic opportunity costs), while doing so is 
straightforward in the latter (x deaths, y buildings destroyed, etc).  
(6) Presumptive legitimacy: At the risk of oversimplification, international 
law is generally prohibitory in nature. In other words, acts which are not 
forbidden are permitted; absent an express prohibition, an act is 
presumptively legitimate.25 For instance, it is well accepted that the 
international law governing the use of force does not prohibit propaganda, 
74 
psychological warfare or espionage. To the extent such activities are 
conducted through cyber operations, they are presumptively legitimate.  
(7) Responsibility: The law of State responsibility (discussed below) 
governs when a State will be responsible for cyber operations. But it must 
be understood that responsibility lies along a continuum from operations 
conducted by a State itself to those in which it is merely involved in some 
fashion. The closer the nexus between a State and the operations, the more 
likely other States will be to characterize them as uses of force, for the 
greater the risk posed to international stability.188 
These seven criteria form the basis of Schmitt’s analytical framework and provide 
a more comprehensive perspective than volume alone on which to judge cyber-attacks in 
terms of use of force. 
Schmitt’s seven different factors help overcome the previous pitfalls of other 
framework(s). First, the seven factors provide definitive questions rather than ambiguous 
and subjective interpretations of the principles of necessity and proportionality. Severity 
provides a scale of damages. At one end of the scale exist attacks that caused “physical 
harm to individuals or property,” and, at the other end, “those generating only minor 
inconvenience or irritation.”189  Directness measures whether the effects are primary, 
secondary, and so on.190  Moreover, measurability provides a metric to quanitify the 
effects of a cyberattack.191  Having definitive factors removes some of the burden for 
decision makers. Rather than having to dig through layers of questions like discussing 
damages under both necessity and proportionality, the Schmitt Analysis already provides 
the necessary questions.   
Crucially, the specificity of the analysis provides a standard to measure 
cyberattacks. In general, most comparisons of one attack to another do not utilize a 
standard framework. Arguments, then, vary from discussing their political effects, 
methodology, and intent, among other criteria resulting in circular conversations. The 
Schmitt Analysis, in contrast, can be universally applied to all cyber-attacks. Therefore, 
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comparisons can be made more equally. It is understandable to review each attack on a 
case-by-case basis, but, without a standard way of comparison, determinations rely on the 
individuals reviewing the case.   
The Schmitt Analysis has also already been effective when applied to cyber-
attacks. Keely applied the analysis to the case in Estonia.192  Each of the seven factors 
were applicable and helped structure the attack. Ultimately, Keely found that, under 
severity, there was no physical harm and thus “no casus belli.”193  Foltz also made an 
analysis of Stuxnet and was also able to apply each of the factors.194  Stuxnet and Estonia 
were different in method, purpose, actors, and time, but both authors produced a similar 
point. The Schmitt Analysis provides a basis by which to accurately describe and 
evaluate any cyberattack. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The Schmitt Analysis, therefore, can be an effective tool in determining 
differences between one cyberattack and another. In turn, analyzing these changes may 
reveal indications of changes in a state’s behavior, China in this case, and potentially 
determine whether the state’s behavior has changed significantly or not. This section 
explains how the Schmitt Analysis can be repurposed, where the data is drawn from, and 
how the data will be analyzed.  
1. A. Repurposing the Schmitt Analysis 
The Schmitt Analysis has a relatively specific purpose: to determine “whether 
particular cyber operations amounted to a use of force.”195 As a result, the criteria is 
geared toward identifying areas of potential tripwires and redlines, the backdrop of which 
is based on international law. Furthermore, Schmitt intended the framework to evaluate a 
cyberattack holistically, judging a cyberattack by analyzing all seven criteria together 
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versus individually, to determine use of force. This thesis repurposes the framework 
slightly: rather than examining whether one given attack crosses a use-of-force threshold, 
the forthcoming analysis compares sixteen cyberattacks attributed to China (for which 
there is robust data) to determine whether Chinese post-Agreement behavior in 
cyberspace has changed. 
A discussion of each of the seven criteria’s potential in measuring changes to 
Chinese behavior and how this thesis applies the criteria follows. 
a. Severity: 
As some critics of the Agreement argue, a drop in the value of attacks does not 
necessarily equate to less damage or less theft by Chinese actors. Instead, as many argue, 
the drop can also be explained by a change in tactics. Rather than a large number of 
unsophisticated attacks, Chinese strategy could have shifted, since the Agreement, toward 
more sophisticated and damaging tools, techniques, and procedures (TTP). As a 
consequence, analysis determining whether the Agreement has or has not been successful 
should, if possible, address these arguments, which this particular criterion, severity, 
does. 
Severity, as defined by Schmitt, offers a way to measure attacks based on the 
amount of damage done. Therefore, by measuring the severity of attacks prior to and 
following the Agreement, the thesis can determine whether the Agreement potentially 
altered the amount of damage done by a particular operation. If there is a notable decline 
in the severity of attacks, the data would potentially suggest the Agreement is successful. 
If, vice versa, severity has increased, critics of the Agreement may be right in that China 
is simply shifting strategy.  
There are, however, some notable pitfalls with measuring severity as a 
determinant for China’s behavior post-Agreement. The following section, Data Sources, 
discusses that the criteria can only be applied to a limited number of credible 
cyberattacks, due in part to limited information. This problem is not limited to severity, 
but extends to all of the criteria. Additionally, severity lacks an effective way to assign 
weight to individual attacks. Not all attacks in an operation aim toward the same goal; 
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some attacks can be more significant than others. Thus, the data could be potentially 
skewed. As a result, this methodology evaluates a cyberattack as the aggregation of 
numerous smaller attacks.  
b. Immediacy: 
Immediacy is not the most directly applicable criterion for the purpose of this 
thesis, but is still useful. As a measurement of cyberattacks crossing the threshold of an 
act of war, immediacy is more useful in the time sensitive nature of decisions regarding 
war than in longer term changes. It can, however, still be useful in determining a change 
in Chinese behavior post-Agreement. Whether attacks are executed quickly or slowly 
provides insight as to the purpose of the attack. Quick strikes suggest efforts are direct 
and purposeful in nature, potentially meaning Chinese actors have an intended target. 
Slower strikes suggest attacks follow a “death by a thousand cuts” methodology, stealing 
information in an opportunistic manner.196 There are, of course, potentially other causal 
reasons for why attacks are more or less timely. For example, slow strikes may also mean 
attackers are attempting to conceal specific actions or may not believe their actions have 
yet been compromised. As a result, immediacy as a criterion may not provide strong 
evidence of change. Nevertheless, data may still provide some insight.  
c. Directness: 
Measuring directness offers a potential way to determine whether there is a shift 
in the purpose of cyberattacks. Similar to immediacy, the more directly related an attack 
is to a consequence , the higher level of confidence there is toward determining the 
purpose of an attack. If, for example, a Chinese cyberattack directly stole an industrial 
secret, the level of directness would be very high. If the level of directness following the 
Agreement falls and damages were more secondary or tertiary in nature, the trend would 
suggest Chinese behavior has positively changed from a U.S. standpoint. A caveat, 
however, is that, much like immediacy, there is some difficulty in establishing what the 
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change in behavior exactly means. As a result, this criterion, directness, is more useful as 
a supplemental criterion. 
d. Invasiveness:  
Although the specific boundaries of cyberspace are difficult to define, a notion of 
sovereign territory still exists. The Internet exists via a series of physical infrastructure 
consisting of routers, servers, computers, and other physical devices. These devices exist 
in the “real world,” meaning that their physical location resides within the boundaries of 
a particular nation/state. Therefore, though cyberattacks occur within ambiguous territory 
and in murky jurisdiction, there is still a measurable amount of invasiveness or intrusion 
taking place. If an attack siphoned data off a server’s hard drive housed within U.S. 
boundaries, there is a high level of invasiveness. Alternatively, if data was siphoned off 
from a transmission from that U.S. server en route to another server, there is a much 
lower level of invasiveness. More simply put, there is a difference between stealing 
something from someone’s home and from taking it from their mailbox.  
e. Measurability: 
Using measurability as a metric is not as useful toward determining sophistication 
as it is a means to examine potential evidence for how best to respond with soft power. 
The theft of the F-35 technology, for instance, is more easily measurable because the 
exact consequences of the information are fairly well known. The exact damage caused 
by Chinese cyber phishing campaigns, on the other hand, are much more difficult to 
measure. While a likely correlation between measurability and sophistication exists, the 
proportion of correlation is unknown. The difference in measurability levels, however, 
does offer a different perspective on the trend of cyberattacks. A shift from high to low 
levels may suggest Chinese actors are taking potential U.S. actions more seriously. 
Consequently, when, and if, that shift occurs, changes the way one might perceive 
behavior since the Agreement. If the change only occurs in line with threats of U.S. 
sanctions, then the Agreement may have had little impact. If, however, the change only 
occurs following the Agreement, then institutional mechanisms play a larger role than 
critics might suggest. 
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f. Presumptive legitimacy 
There appears to be a clear difference in perspective and/or opinion with respect 
to cyber espionage. As RAND pointed out, U.S. officials imply that there is a difference 
between theft of industrial trade secrets and theft of military secrets.197 According the 
Agreement, the former should be banned, hence the point of the Agreement, while the 
latter is more acceptable. China’s view, however, does not appear to see the same 
difference, possibly equating economic theft as a pillar of national security. The 
Agreement appears to push China toward recognizing a difference, which this particular 
criterion can measure. Taking the perspective of the U.S., measuring attacks based on 
whether they are in line with international law or not may offer insight as to whether 
China may or may not perceive a difference in industry theft versus military theft.  
g. Responsibility/Attributability 
Lastly, responsibility originally refers to the role of the state in conducting a cyber 
operation. As pointed out by Mandiant’s report on APT1, even a mountain of evidence 
does not equate to definitive proof of a state’s involvement.198 As a result, this thesis 
suggests a slight alteration or, rather, a different interpretation. If one, instead, measures 
the level to which a particular cyber operation can be attributed to a state actor, one may 
attain better insight as to whether China is making increased efforts at concealing their 
attempts. This does not necessarily rule out better control of reigning in freelance or 
moonlighting hackers, but, coupled with the volume of attacks, it may support or 
contradict critics’ claims that Chinese attacks are moving toward a Russian model  
2. Data Sources 
At the time of this thesis, a definitive source that compiles cyberattacks attributed 
to China does not exist. There are, however, five documents that list a number of 
cyberattacks, which together make up a fairly comprehensive list. They are as follows: 
                                                 
197 Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki and Astrid Cevallos, Getting to Yes with China in 
Cyberspace, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1335.html. 
198 M. I. Center, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant, Tech. Rep, 
Tech. Rep., 2013. 
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“Cyber Incidents Attributed to China,” “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,”“Cyber 
Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2014,” “Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies Since 
November 2014,” and “Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2016.”199   
The first document, “Cyber Incidents Attributed to China,” is included for two 
reasons.200 First, the organization and the authors of the documents represent one of the 
foremost subject matter experts on the topic. CSIS is a non-profit policy research think 
tank that covers a litany of subjects, but, rather notably in regards to cybersecurity, is 
often involved in many international discussions and exchanges. Additionally, James A. 
Lewis, now Senior Vice-President of CSIS, has covered Chinese cyber policies for 
several years and, as a result, is often brought in to testify to Congress on the subject; 
thus, he can be considered one the foremost authorities on the subject. Second, the depth 
and clarity of the document are superior to any other list. Lewis breaks document into 
two sections, actions attributed to a specific individual and/or entity and actions attributed 
to China in general. He is the only one to both identify and separate attacks attributed to 
China as well as differentiate the attacks by whether the attacker has been specifically 
identified or not. The list, however, only covers a period from 1991 to 2013. 
Furthermore, the list does not include attacks potentially attributed to China, thus the data 
set is fairly limited. 
The next document, however, helps bridge those gaps, by providing more data 
and more recent cyberattacks. CSIS’s “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” adds the 
weight of the organization to support its veracity.201 In addition, the list is continuously 
updated by a number of researchers, thus providing as close to up-to-date information as 
                                                 
199 Laura Saporito and James A. Lewis, “Cyber Incidents Attributed to China,” Center for Strategic 
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“Cyber Attacks on U.S. Companies in 2016,” The Heritage Foundation, December 2, 2016, 
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200  Saporito and Lewis, “Cyber Incidents Attributed to China.”  
201 CSIS, “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006.”  
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possible. While it does not separate attacks attributed to China specifically, the list does 
include the national origin of the cyberattack when available, thereby allowing this thesis 
to differentiate attacks for the purpose of this chapter.  
The last three documents are generated by the Heritage Foundation’s Riley 
Walters, another U.S. think tank that specializes in policy issues.202 Walters, a research 
associate, started his list in 2014 and continues to provide annual updates. Again, while 
not separating China as the actor specifically, his list does provide an important 
distinction of cyberattacks on U.S. companies versus foreign companies. The inclusion of 
these documents provides a secondary source of information, helping to separate source 
bias as well as to provide more data points to analyze.  
Drawing from these five documents, this author then compiled a list of attacks 
possessing two particular criteria: cyberattacks that potentially originated from or were 
attributed to China or Chinese actors and cyberattacks whose target(s) were U.S. 
companies/organizations. Then, from this list, the cyberattacks were again limited down 
to the attacks with significant research behind them; specifically, attacks with enough 
reporting data to determine numerical values for each of the criteria from Schmitt 
Analysis (as explained in the following section). In total, sixteen attacks met the set 
criteria.  
3. Method of Analysis 
Borrowing the idea from the research paper, “Measured Responses to Cyber 
Attacks Using Schmitt Analysis: A Case Study of Attack Scenarios for a Software-
Intensive System,”203 this thesis similarly applies a quantitative scale to each of the 
criteria under the Schmitt Analysis for each cyber incident. The presumption is that 
applying a quantitative scale permits “any given operation could be described in 
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qualitative terms as being closer to one end of a spectrum or the other.”204 As a result, 
each criterion was assigned a value of 1–100 with the following goal. Values closer to 
100 represent where Chinese actions violated the terms and/or spirit of the Agreement 
more grossly, whereas values closer to 1 represent actions closer to cooperation.  
For severity, the values for each attack were assigned based on the suspected 
economic damages, either actual or attempted. In addition, values were assigned in two 
different ways. The first method assigned values based on total damages caused. The 
second method assigned values based on damages on private companies, excluding 
government and military information. LuckyCat, for example, registered a higher score in 
total damages considering overall damages as the attack primarily targeted military 
information, however, registered a much lower score in terms of private industry damage 
considering only damages to the private sector as the malware was not suspected to have 
impacted the general public as it targeted a specific audience.  
For immediacy, valuation consisted of two factors: how quickly damages were 
caused between initial intrusion and actual theft and for what amount of time the attack 
persisted.  
For directness, valuation mainly considered whether the theft was a target of 
opportunity or not. Some analysts have described Chinese cyberattacks as “death by a 
thousand cuts.” Essentially, Chinese methodology consisted of targets of opportunity, 
stealing information where possible rather than goal oriented. Thus, values to 1 indicate 
damages created by opportunity and values closer to 100 indicate targeted theft. 
For invasiveness, valuation consisted of determining where the attacks took place. 
Lower values indicate theft occurring on Chinese infrastructure. Middle values indicate 
theft occurring during transmission between different parties. Lastly, higher values 
indicate theft from networks and computers within the United States. The purpose of this 
valuation is to differentiate attacks that may have higher or lower deniability. Chinese 
traffic on Chinese servers, for example, is less incriminating than Chinese traffic on U.S. 
servers. 
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For measurability, valuation consisted of how well damages for an attack can be 
measured. Low values indicate attacks with reported intrusion(s) but whose theft is 
relatively unknown. High value, in contrast, indicate attacks with more well-known 
damages such as the theft of the F-35 data. 
For presumptive legitimacy, scores are assigned based on whether the target(s) 
were government/military or civilian targets, lower scores assigned to the former and 
higher for the latter. 
For responsibility, scores were assigned as to how well the attack could be tied 
toward Chinese actors. Higher scores indicate a greater level of attribution and lower 
scores represent attacks with greater plausible deniability.  
In regards to weighting among these factors, the analysis gives more emphasis 
toward severity. Severity, as a scale of damage, is, perhaps, the closest parallel assessment 
to the volume of attacks as the two are linked in many ways. For instance, one way to 
view the volume of attacks is to equate volume with damage, however, higher volume 
does not necessarily mean higher damage. Thus, severity is a means to cut out the 
middleman. Therefore, since much of the analysis on the Agreement utilizes volume of 
attack as the ruling metric, severity is weighed more heavily than the other six criteria.  
The other six criteria, however, still play an important role, either strengthening or 
playing spoiler to an overall conclusion. As the data and analysis later show, some of the 
criteria suggest stronger confidence in a declining trend while others suggest skepticism 
and doubt. Furthermore, three of the six remaining criteria, responsibility, measurability, 
and presumptive legitimacy, are also weighed slightly more heavily than the others. For 
the purpose of this thesis, these three are more applicable for the analysis. Responsibility 
addresses trends in identifying China as the perpetrator of an attack, which can translate 
to confidence in the data itself. Similarly, measurability addresses trends in how well 
companies can identify damages, which also translates to the degree of confidence in the 
data. Last, presumptive legitimacy addresses whether the attack was on a civilian or 
government organization. Since the Agreement differentiates civilian companies as 
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unacceptable targets and government companies as potentially legitimate, a change in 
Chinese attacks toward either also changes the overall assessment. 
In comparison, the other three criteria, immediacy, directness, and invasiveness, 
play a lesser role in applicability. There is a lack of information due to this author’s lack 
of technical knowledge of the author and a lack of data on the attacks themselves. None 
of the reports provide an in-depth timeline and given the nature of cyberspace operations, 
identifying when and for how long a cyberattack went on for is shaky at best. 
Additionally, much of the technical details are difficult to transcribe into measures of 
directness and invasiveness. Little, if any, of the framework provides a means to translate 
methods of attack into a measure of either criterion.   
4. Limitations 
During research and assigning values for each attack, this author discovered 
several limitations in analysis. First, although the purpose of quantifying the data is to 
create a more objective approach toward analysis of cyberattacks, in practice, the 
assigned values are still fairly subjective. As a result, Appendix B contains the raw data 
used to produce the graphs, which, as will be covered Chapter V, can be used for future 
research. Presumptive legitimacy, for example, is relatively subjective considering attacks 
on both private and public sector. An attack on 10 total targets, 7 governmental systems 
and 3 civilian systems, versus an attack on 20 total targets, 14 government and 6 civilian, 
has the same ratio, but ratio is not necessarily the best measure. There are far more 
civilian companies than governmental agencies, thus it is potentially more accurate to 
weigh attacks on government systems more heavily.  
Second, each of the criteria consists of several subset criteria, thereby potentially 
generating a bias in observation. Considering severity, while this thesis measures 
economic damages, the value does not necessarily reflect economic gain for China. 
Stolen emails and data does not mean China succeeded in improving their position, nor 
does the theft of military information necessitate a gain in technological capacity. Data 
from the F-35 program could have been used to generate counter-tactics, rather than 
furthering China’s aviation program.  
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Lastly, the data gathered is inherently skewered toward known and/or reported 
attacks. As a result, it is possible that there are far more attacks by Chinese actors than 
the ones listed, especially considering there is often a delay in discovery of a cyber 
intrusion. Furthermore, given the complexities and politics of classified and confidential 
information as well as a myriad of factors that make reporting of cyber intrusions 
undesirable, it is likely there are more incidents than ones analyzed in this thesis. 
D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Overall, the findings in every category were fairly sporadic. Under all seven 
criteria, there did appear to be a discernable pattern of activity. The results ultimately 
suggest that Chinese cyberattacks have either remained unchanged over time or declined 
in a way that is favorable from a U.S. standpoint. This section describes the findings for 
each of the criteria and analyzes of the data, providing possible insight as to what 
conclusions one may draw from such results. Additionally, each explanation also 
discusses pitfalls in using this methodology and identifies possible areas of improvement 
for future research. 
1. Severity 
This section depicts two graphs. The valuation for the severity of attacks can be 
seen in Figures 15 and 16. Total damage inflicted is reflected in Figure 15 whereas 
economic impact is displayed in Figure 16. Additionally, like Chapter III, this section 
displays linear trend lines and their associated function and R-squared values.  
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Figure 15.  Severity (Total) from Date of Earliest Indication205  
 
Figure 16.  Severity (Economic) from Date of Earliest Indication.206 
In Figures 15 and 16, the data suggests that the dominant opinion is correct: the 
Agreement has made no major impact. Instead, the decline in attacks, or in this case, 
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severity, is a change taking place over a number of years, which one can see from the 
trend lines. Figures 15 and 16 show a slope function of   
0.0058 290.35y x    
and 
0.0028 155.17y x    
Both equations possess negative m-values, suggesting severity, in either case, is 
declining. While neither value is particularly large, their values do suggest a trend to 
U.S.-China cyber relations.  
This decline in the severity of attacks, while slow, is a step in the right direction 
from a U.S. standpoint. If this trend persists, the possibilities for more areas of mutual 
understanding and cooperation like the Agreement are likely to increase. Therefore, 
although far from a foregone conclusion, the Agreement may potentially become akin to 
the 1972 Communique, a moment in bilateral relations aiding to the actual normalization 
of relations between the United States and China. Furthermore, because the severity of 
attacks is not rising, the trend contradicts the counter-argument that China is adopting a 
Russian model. If, as analysts like Mr. Costello suggested, Chinese policies were 
adopting the Russian model, one would expect to see a rise in severity. More 
sophisticated and targeted attacks, theoretically, should cause more damage. Expectations 
would include theft of multiple programs or intellectual property such as blueprints for 
Apple’s iPhone. The data, instead, shows not only fewer instances, but also fewer 
indications of intellectual property actually being siphoned off.  
Overall, the data from severity appears promising. There is a decline and, more 
importantly, there is not a rise in attacks. Thus, should conditions hold, it seems prudent 
to push for additional cooperation. Despite such promise, however, there are limitations 
in the data, particularly the slow rate of change and the relative lack of information means 
the United States should move forward cautiously in U.S.-China cyber relations. 
The slow rate of change is concerning because of how quickly the results may 
become irrelevant. If, for example, there is a drop from 50 to 40 (-10) over the span of 
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one year, but a rise from 40 to 80 (+40) in the following year, then small initial drop may 
mean very little. Therefore, although there has been a decline in severity over the past 
decade, one bad year can quickly reverse the trend. If, instead, the decline was much 
larger, then reversing the trend would be much more difficult. For instance, a drop from 
100 to 50 (-50) in one year and a rise from 50 to 90 (+40) the following year is still an 
overall decline. As a result, assurances from one government to the other can remain 
fairly robust, even if there is a surge from unsanctioned hackers. Although such numbers 
do not preclude cooperative efforts, the small rate of change will likely elicit, with good 
reason, caution from the U.S. side. 
Also eliciting some caution from the results is the relative lack of information on 
the attacks. As many of the following sections also discuss, the reports generally lack 
information vital for the determining specific Chinese behavior in cyberspace. In the case 
of severity, none of the reporting data specified what was stolen or listed specific 
damages from the intrusion. Analysts report that data relating to a specific program or 
piece of intellectual property was stolen, but they do not specify what the data is exactly. 
Moreover and related to the data, analysts do not provide any dollar estimates of damages 
caused by the attacks.  
In sum, the data on severity is promising, but not concrete enough for the United 
States to presume Chinese behavior has completely changed. As is discussed later, such 
results will likely come to play a much larger role as talks and further agreements 
continue between the United States and China.  
2. Immediacy, Directness, and Responsibility 
Valuations for immediacy, directness, and responsibility are reflected in Figures 
17, 18, and 19. 
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Figure 17.  Immediacy207 
 
 
Figure 18.  Directness208 
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208 Note: Data was derived from multiple sources. See Appendix B for details.  
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Figure 19.  Responsibility209 
The data in Figures 17, 18, and 19, shown above, also suggests that there is a promising 
trend in Chinese behavior. In Figure 17, the values were assigned based on two criteria: 
the timeline between intrusion and attack and the overall length of intrusion. This author 
assigned higher values if the timeline and length of intrusion were rising, and lower 
values if the reverse. The result being a slope equation of:  
0.0054 256.83y x    
Again, there is a negative m-value indicating the trend is falling. The data, thus, suggests 
attacks are occurring closer to the initial intrusion and that the overall length of intrusion 
is decreasing.  
Figure 18, similarly, suggests there is a rising trend in cause and effect. The m-
value in this case is positive with a slope equation of:   
0.001 35.606y x   
The value, although small, indicates that Chinese attacks are more goal-oriented 
than targets of opportunity. Shady Rat, for example, attacked multiple companies in the 
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same industry, suggesting the attackers’ strategy was to gain information where available. 
Problems of this strategy are that there is much more opportunity to discover the attacks 
and that efforts are often duplicated. Since, however, Figure 18 shows a positive value, 
the data suggests attacks are more focused and targeted. 
Lastly, Figure 19 suggests that analysts are growing better at tying attacks to 
Chinese actors. The positive m-value, in this case, shows there is a rising trend at 
attributing cyberattacks to Chinese actors. Comparing the information on “Wicked Rose” 
and the indictments of Su Bin and APT1, for example, highlight analysts growing 
capabilities at attributing China as the perpetrator with more substantial proof.210 Ken 
Dunham and Jim Melnick identified Tan Dailin as the leader of Wicked Rose in 2006.211 
Analysts tied him to the attacks by identifying his social media profile, tracing his 
location back to China, and establishing his ties to the CCP.212 While the evidence is 
fairly strong, much of the data is still circumstantial. The indictments, in comparison, are 
much more compelling. The documents list exact dates on when particular portions of the 
operation were launched, including when email addresses were created, when files were 
sent, and where data was hosted.213 The evidence makes it far more difficult for the 
actors to deny their involvement and, as a result, are much more damaging for China’s 
image internationally.  
These findings suggest that there is some change in Chinese behavior. Chinese 
actors appear to be attacking more directly. Rather than infiltrating a network, monitoring 
traffic, and then waiting to siphon information, infiltration and theft seem to occur in a 
much faster sequence. One explanation in this shift is that attackers’ efforts are better 
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targeted. As time progresses, Chinese policy, as will be explored in greater detail in the 
following chapter, may be shifting from the “death by a thousand cuts” toward precision 
guided attacks.214 Attackers, whom previously infiltrated networks to monitor traffic in 
hopes of finding information, may now have preassigned data to steal.  
There are also many alternative explanations for this shift in behavior. Rising 
technological innovation and improved techniques, for example, suggest change could be 
expected. Discovery of new zero day exploits and an increase in infrastructure capacity to 
transfer data allow for much faster attacks. As a result, terabytes of data can be stolen in 
the matter of seconds rather than minutes.  
Of course, there are many counters to both explanations. As discussed earlier, 
there is an apparent lack of data. Many of the reports do specify the length of intrusion, 
but none of the reports describe their confidence level in their assessments. It is possible 
intrusions occurred over a larger period of time, but were undiscovered. Additionally, the 
reports focus on the offensive elements of the attacks, ignoring any discussion of 
defensive capabilities. Therefore, there is some uncertainty in the reliability of the 
conclusions. 
Despite the unreliability, however, the data are indicative. If intrusion lengths are 
falling and better targeted, and Chinese behavior has shifted, this alters part of the 
previous conjectures. A drop in the volume of attacks and more targeted efforts do 
suggest a change toward the Russian model; however, the drop in severity suggests that 
may be a good thing. Fewer attacks, albeit more targeted and sophisticated, coupled with 
less severity, together mean less damage overall. This suggests reversal of the rising trend 
of “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history,” or at the very least that the situation 
is not getting worse.215  
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Valuation for invasiveness is reflected in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Invasiveness216 
The results from invasiveness suggest there is almost no change in Chinese 
behavior. The slope equation from the data is: 
0.000096 70.700495y x    
The m-value, in this case, is relatively negligible. The value from directness, for 
comparison, was 0.001 and was the smallest m-value outside of invasiveness. Even so, 
the value from directness is over 100 times greater than the m-value here. This value 
suggests that overall Chinese attacks continue to intrude into networks unchanged, 
varying between U.S. and non-US networks, but generally operating intrusively onto U.S. 
infrastructure.  
Since attacks generally occur on U.S. networks, this thesis can infer a couple 
conclusions on Chinese behavior. First, despite any rhetoric criticizing China, attacks are 
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likely to focus their efforts on U.S. networks. Likely due to security policies governing 
that intellectual property be kept on U.S. infrastructure, attacks seem unlikely to shift 
their focus to theft on Chinese servers. Second, attacks appear limited toward exploits 
over networks rather than hardware exploits. None of the attacks, thus far, have used 
hardware as part of their methodology. If, for example, attackers began to use embedded 
hardware to sniff and steal data, the baseline for invasiveness would likely increase as 
attacks would become far more intrusive. Therefore, this thesis can conclude, for now, 
cyberattacks are unlikely to delve into the physical realm. 
4. Measurability 
Valuation for measurability is reflected in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.  Measurability217 
The results in measurability show a declining trend in the ability to evaluate 
damages. As time progresses, it is increasingly more difficult to assess the damages 
caused by a cyberattack. Although a relatively small m-value, the value is still negative 
with a slope equation of: 
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0.0027 154.97y x    
The negative value indicates that the damage from an attack is becoming harder to 
evaluate. Either reports are becoming less focused on discussing the damages caused by 
an attack, or there is less information on the damages. The first explanation is amendable. 
Without diving into the realm of shareholders and incentives for a company to do so, 
analysts and companies can do a better job on reporting the damages inflicted by a 
cyberattack.  
In the case of the latter explanation, however, the trend complicates the ability to 
provide an accurate analysis. If companies simply do not know what was stolen, then all 
of the previous conclusions may be wrong. Given previously discussed presumptions that 
Chinese hackers are caught and identified more frequently, and therefore are less 
sophisticated and less worrisome than Russian hackers, then a reverse of this position 
means reformulating all analysis based on those assumptions. If, alternatively, Chinese 
attacks have advanced now to the point where the information stolen is unknown, the 
data would suggest their level of sophistication is rising to a point beyond prior 
assessments. The evaluation under severity, then, may underestimate the damage of 
cyberattacks. If, instead, severity is rising, the data would then suggest the shift in 
Chinese behavior is more worrisome, not less. 
5. Presumptive Legitimacy 
Another problematic shift in Chinese behavior is reflected in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22.  Presumptive Legitimacy218 
Again, represented by the negative m-value, the graph suggests attacks are moving 
toward civilian rather military or government targets. As the Agreement specifically 
stipulated that neither side would engage in economic theft, thereby inferring a difference 
from military and government targets, one would hope behavior would change away 
from civilian targets. Instead, however, attacks appear to move toward only civilian 
targets.  
This trend is particularly alarming considering overall Chinese behavior. If 
China’s methodology is moving toward the Russian model, then the drop in attacks and 
severity may primarily come from a shift away from government and military targets. 
Therefore, the Agreement and promising trend in Chinese behavior may mean far less 
than previously discussed.  
E. PROSPECTIVE ALTERNATIVES 
Since this analysis is built upon a subjective perception of the criteria and data, 
there exist several other methods of interpreting and evaluating the data. This section 
discusses some of the possible alternatives, particularly those generating results that 
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differ substantially from the results presented in Section D. Additionally, Appendix C 
provides the raw data used to create the graphs in this section to again allow for future 
research and evaluation. 
1. Severity 
Recalling, briefly, that one of the main purposes of the Agreement is to stem 
economically motivated cyber espionage, a way to measure severity and the 
successfulness of the Agreement is to track potential gains. Rather than economic 
damage, tracking economic gains potentially offers a way to assess whether there is a 
change in thresholds for cyberattack. If, for example, cyberattacks shift toward attacking 
only high reward targets and cease attacking low reward targets, then one can infer that 
there is a change in China’s risk calculations. Given, however, the relative lack of 
information regarding intellectual property, much of the analysis is speculative. It is not 
reported or otherwise not known what information was potentially compromised or 
actually stolen. The analysis, therefore, assigned values from zero to two, with zero being 
no commercial value, one as low value, and two as high value. The measurement of 
severity is depicted in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23.  Severity219 
No apparent pattern is discernible in Figure 23. While there is a distinctly short 
sample size of data following the Agreement, the data thus far does not indicate a 
preference for high value commercial targets. Instead, attacks are varied between 
“legitimate” targets and private enterprises. Thus, looking at the data this way, Chinese 
behavior may remain unchanged in terms of target selection, thereby also discounting the 
findings in presumptive legitimacy. 
If Chinese behavior remains unchanged, however, then the earlier interpretation 
that severity is decreasing may be more promising for the United States. Since the target 
list is not shifting toward military targets, the declining trend likely includes commercial 
targets. More simply put, damage inflicted by Chinese attacks on commercial companies 
apparently has fallen. 
2. Invasiveness 
Another alternative perspective concerns the concept of invasiveness. Instead of 
defining invasiveness as sovereign territory of a state, one can instead define it in terms 
akin to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. To provide a brief summary, the 
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OSI model is a conceptual framework of how data is communicated over a network. The 
framework is split into seven layers, shown in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  OSI Layers220 
The seven layers designate different locations at which data can exist. For the 
purpose of the present analysis, in regards to invasiveness, this translates to differing 
depths of penetration. Taking the perspective of the target system, the layers can be 
perceived as levels of invasiveness from one to seven with one, the physical layer, as the 
least invasive and seven as the most invasive. Consequently, this author’s measurement 
of invasiveness is provided in Figure 25. 
                                                 




Figure 25.  Invasiveness221 
The data shows that intrusions routinely and consistently reached the application 
layer. Though many of the attacks started via phishing attacks, the theft ultimately 
occurred directly through client-based applications. In terms of a physical domain 
analogy, attackers routinely stole directly from the victim’s home instead of stealing 
packages from the front door.  
While alarming, however, the results may suggest a major flaw in the data. As the 
idiom goes, the squeaky wheel gets the grease. Reports of Chinese cyber intrusions are 
inherently biased toward those that succeed. In other words, reports do not generally 
cover failed attempts. Given the fact that attacks use the same infrastructure and medium 
as legitimate traffic, it is difficult to differentiate the signals, attacks, from the noise, 
routine. Furthermore, as many of the reports suggests, cyberattacks occur frequently and 
often, but systems are designed to stop them before they have a chance to succeed. Thus, 
the data likely omits many failed attempts by Chinese actors. As a result, there is a degree 
of uncertainty in the confidence of the overall trends. 
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3. Other Prospects 
Though neither of the alternate perspectives completely discredits the overall 
findings in Section D, they do highlight the possibility and potential of contradictory 
results. Furthermore, as additional information on existing attacks and new attacks comes 
out, the findings and alternate perspectives must also adjust. Analysis of invasiveness can 
be changed to differentiate between stealing and corrupting data. Responsibility can be 
adjusted based on U.S. indictments, providing a scale of the extent the U.S. or U.S. 
companies are willing to identify the PRC as the perpetrator. In sum, there are many 
other potential perspectives with which to test the data, reinforcing how the Schmitt 
Analysis provides additional utility as a framework for analysis. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the findings from using the Schmitt Analysis support much of the current 
dialogue around the Agreement: “cautious optimism.”222 Chinese behavior is changing. 
The severity of attacks is falling; therefore, there appears to be less damage to the United 
States. Additionally, Chinese methodology appears to be moving away from death by a 
thousand cuts and lastly, the United States is getting better at tying Chinese actors to the 
crime. As a result, there is much to be hopeful about. 
Yet, the problems under measurability and presumptive legitimacy may spoil all 
of those achievements. If attacks are harder to measure and are solely focused on civilian 
organizations, the Agreement may be doomed. The two sides seemingly established that 
theft in support of national defense, or in this case cyberattacks on military and 
government organizations, is acceptable, but attacks on civilian organizations are not. If 
China, however, entered into the Agreement with false intent, future cooperative efforts 
may be greatly impacted for the worse. More importantly, if the United States acts too 
much in good faith and does not challenge and investigate whether China is holding up 
its end of the bargain, the greatest transfer of wealth might just come to fruition. Thus, 
the U.S. must proceed with caution. 
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Lastly, in terms of the Agreement, the results here essentially support FireEye’s 
findings. Rather than a watershed moment, the Agreement appears to be a continuation of 
change in Chinese behavior. Chinese policy seems to be focusing away from stealing 
U.S. secrets, perhaps part of an attempt to grow their own domestic innovation. In any 
case, the Agreement seems to be part of a much larger change. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Nothing is permanent in this wicked world, not even our troubles. 
―Charlie Chaplin 
Like any relationship, trends in U.S.-China cyber relations are far from 
permanent. One good year does not necessarily dictate the results of the following year, 
especially considering the ever-evolving nature of the cyber domain. As shown in Zhao 
Weibin’s article, “The Four Stages of Sino-American Cyber Relations,” the nature of 
U.S.–China cyber relations can change and have changed rapidly and with little 
forewarning.223 For example, Google’s withdrawal in 2010 displayed how quickly U.S.–
China ties in the private sector can dissolve. In addition, China’s withdrawal from the 
U.S.–China Cyber Working Groups in 2014 amidst U.S. accusations of cyber espionage 
also showed that public sector ties can dissolve equally fast. Moreover, both cases were 
preceded by years of cooperative efforts including confidence-building measures, yet still 
dissolved rapidly.  
Still, despite the relatively impermanent nature of a relationship, one can draw 
clues of how best to go forward to give ourselves the best chance at an optimal outcome. 
This thesis, as a result, investigated and analyzed the 2015 U.S.-China Cyber Agreement 
for clues that may aid U.S. decision-makers as to the future outcomes and implications 
the Agreement has had on the international community and toward shaping norms in 
cyberspace. 
Consequently, this final chapter reviews and summarizes the overall findings 
from the previous chapters and synthesizes the broader significance in terms of U.S. 
cyber policy and future research. This chapter is organized as follows. Section A provides 
a summary of the findings. Section B, then, explains the implication of the results in 
terms of the model provided in Chapter I. Section C provides policy recommendations 
based on the results. Last, Section D identifies areas for future research and analysis. 
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter II explored whether the impact of the Agreement would be limited as 
skeptics like David A. Mussington and Shannon Tiezzi warned or whether the evidence 
suggested a broader behavior shift on China’s part.224 After review of current evidence 
from the two years following the Agreement, the results suggest that there is a genuine 
attempt on the part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to improve U.S.-China cyber 
relations. Since the Agreement, the CCP made several policy changes that are much 
closer to U.S. norms. From the development of intellectual property rights to establishing 
additional international cyber agreements with other countries, the CCP’s efforts seem to 
be sincere. More importantly, U.S.-China cyber relations are better than they have ever 
been. 
In Chapter III, this thesis explored the data surrounding the volume of attacks and 
found that the Agreement likely played a part toward improving U.S.-China cyber 
relations. While the data supports FireEye’s assessment that the Agreement was not a 
watershed moment, it did act as an accelerant, speeding the rate of change. Additionally, 
in terms of global cyberattacks, Hackmageddon’s data supports that finding: there is little 
other explanation as to why the rate of drops increases in 2016, given 2016’s absence of 
punitive actions. Lastly, trends of rising capabilities in cybersecurity and lack of evidence 
for improving Chinese cyber techniques suggest that fears of China moving toward a 
Russian model are unwarranted. Thus, overall, Chapter III’s analysis of the data suggests, 
from a U.S. standpoint, a more promising relationship. 
While that is promising, judging cyber-relations by volume alone leaves 
significant gaps in knowledge. Going beyond the general reliance on the volume of 
attacks as the sole metric on which to judge the effectiveness of the Agreement, Chapter 
IV repurposed the Schmitt Analysis as an alternative model to weigh the Agreement. 
Using Schmitt’s seven criteria, this thesis evaluated Chinese cyberattacks and found 
                                                 
224 B. David A. Mussington, “The Missing Compliance Framework in the 2015 U.S.-China 
Cybersecurity Agreement,” Institute for Defense Analysis, November 18, 2015, 
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/ITSD/2015/D-5648.ashx; 
Shannon Tiezzi, “The Limits of a US-China Cyber Deal,” The Diplomat, September 22, 2015, 
https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-limits-of-a-us-china-cyber-deal/. 
105 
similar results to Chapter III: Chinese behavior is changing in a way that is more 
beneficial for the United States. China is shifting toward less damaging attacks, and U.S. 
ability to accurately and confidently attribute attacks, with particular regards to Chinese 
actors, is improving. 
Overall, in the two years since the Agreement, the evidence suggests hope for a 
better, more promising U.S.-China cyber relationship. Not only are there fewer attacks, 
but the two are also strengthening ties by expanding bilateral institutions that help 
insulate cooperative efforts from short term developments like changing presidents or 
minor conflicts. In the end, actions are following words; thus, although the United States 
must act cautiously, there is reason for hope. 
B. HYPOTHESIS ASSESSMENT 
The conceptual design of this thesis aimed to examine the impact of the 
Agreement on U.S.-China cyber relations by exploring four possible outcomes as shown 
in Figure 26.  




Ultimately, the results of this thesis found that the impact fell into quadrant B, a 
move toward global norms. The data strongly suggests positive results; not only is there a 
drop in the volume of attacks, but indications are that China is not moving toward a 
Russian model. Additionally, given the changes in Chinese policy, the evidence suggests 
the Agreement made a broader impact in U.S.-China cyber relations as the two are acting 
more cooperatively than ever and China is expanding similar engagement globally. These 
developments are likely to positively influence the development of global cyber norms. 
Prior to the Agreement, the two sides’ perception of cyberspace vastly differed. 
General sentiment in the United States perceived China as the clear cyber aggressor, 
causing deliberate harm to the U.S. economy and security. From a Chinese perceptive, 
however, U.S. accusations were ridiculous and just a means to draw attention away from 
similar U.S. actions. As a result, U.S.-China cyber relations seemed doomed because 
policymakers would be fated to talk around one another. 
Following the Agreement, however, with perspectives more closely aligned, 
which makes establishing global cyber norms much more feasible. Starting in 1998, the 
United Nations Group of Government Experts (GGE) “began considering issues of 
cybersecurity.”225 Since then, the panel discussed the topic of establishing global cyber 
norms multiple times though they failed to find common ground. Although talks also 
failed in their most recent attempt in June of 2017, it appears as though China was a 
much more active participant.226 Given that, in the past, China has generally been a 
passive participant, their new role suggests hope from a U.S. standpoint. With the 
changes described in this thesis, establishing a global taboo on economically motivated 
cyber espionage seems more likely, especially considering the numerous bilateral 
agreements between China and other states being formed today. Such future progress 
would be a tangible indicator that trends identified in this thesis are continuing.   
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Recognizably, however, many of the previous criticisms of the Agreement remain 
true. There is no consensus on “what the United States and China would constitute as an 
economic target,” nor does the Agreement specify any consequences should either side 
violate the terms.227 Furthermore, with the growth of the Internet of Things and other 
major technological and societal developments, the U.S.-China cyber relationship could 
essentially change overnight. Therefore, both parties need to take caution moving 
forward.  
On the U.S. side, relying on a decline of Chinese cyber espionage could still 
feasible play into a malicious Chinese strategy. Much like nuclear strategy conversations, 
policies that commit the United States to act a certain way based on faulty assumptions 
are dangerous. For example, some critics argue the nuclear deal with Iran plays into 
Iranian strategy of biding time until Iran’s economic strength is sufficient to continue a 
nuclear program. In that case, the United States is acting on a faulty assumption of how 
much Iran values a role as an active participant in the global community. China is 
potentially playing a similar role. If so, the 2015 Agreement is simply a way to stall for 
time until China is better equipped and ready to use cyber espionage to its benefit.   
Still, the evidence suggests many of the skeptics are wrong to be pessimistic. The 
Agreement does not appear to be “purely ‘symbolic’” and, more importantly, it has not 
been “unfeasible for China to uphold.”228 Especially considering Chinese policy 
developments, many of the skeptics seem to underestimate the CCP and overly pursue 
China as an enemy. As a result, viewing the CCP only a cyber adversary risks missing an 
opportunity for further strengthening of these nascent cooperative achievements. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the results of the Agreement examined in Chapters II, III, and IV, this 
thesis argues that U.S. policy should progress toward expanding U.S.–China cyber 
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cooperation. Additionally, the changing security environment coupled with the ever 
increasing development of technological innovations suggest an increasing level of 
futility in the reliance on punitive actions and defensive measures as a means to stop or 
even limit the rising costs of cyber espionage. As a result, a combination of the 
cooperation and defense is necessary to solving the problem of economically motivated 
cyber espionage between the two nations.  
1. Preventing the Proliferation of Cyber Espionage 
Since damages of cyber espionage continue to grow at an alarming rate, a critical 
element of U.S. policy must work to solve that problem. Especially given more bilateral 
talks with China, the two cyber superpowers are in a unique position to work together 
toward discouraging commercial cyber espionage more broadly.  
First, with both nations’ history of using a myriad of cyber tools, techniques, and 
procedures to pilfer intellectual property, the two have a distinct advantage in patching 
security vulnerabilities. One of the major problems in cyber defense is simply knowing 
what to defend. As previously discussed, one of the more complicated techniques is the 
utilization of zero-day exploits. Thus, sharing knowledge of exploits and how to patch 
them can be a cornerstone of preventing and limiting the effectiveness of lower-tier 
hacker groups, like script kiddies. To that effect, policy should work toward establishing 
more bilateral ties and talks, particularly among organizations below the strategic level 
like the FBI, CIA, and so on. The possibility of sharing information, however, is limited 
by cyber realities. The nature of exploits make them an asset both offensively and 
defensively. Knowledge of a security vulnerability gives an attacker another avenue for 
penetration and gives a defender the location of the path needing to be blocked. Coupled 
with the fact that incentives to steal intellectual property are only growing larger, the 
degree of knowledge sharing will likely be limited. 
Second, bilateral ties and cooperative efforts can increase the effectiveness of 
punitive measures. Given the global nature of cyberattacks and the reality of perpetrators 
often living outside of a single nation’s jurisdictional boundaries, U.S. and Chinese 
efforts toward establishing global norms and international laws are key to 
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nonproliferation. Both nations are establishing more and more bilateral cyber agreements. 
As a result, not only are the odds of creating global cyber norms rising, but emergence of 
a network of smaller scale agreements offers a promising future for punishing criminals 
outside of state’s jurisdiction. The United States and China can potentially work as the 
middlemen to punish a malicious cyber actor, even among other nations with less than 
desirable bilateral relations like India and Pakistan. 
Last, like the early stages of the many trade agreements, the 2015 U.S.–China 
Cyber Agreement can be strengthened in several ways. First and foremost, the two sides 
need to insulate the Agreement from rapid changes in the political environment. As an 
informal agreement between President Obama and President Xi, the Agreement is not 
protected by ratification by each nation’s respective legislation. Second and related to the 
first, verification and punitive measures need to be established. The two sides need to 
consider defining the parameters of what breaking the Agreement means and, in the event 
that one violates the Agreement, how to punish the offending state. As in the case of trade 
agreements, there is a lack of incentive for either state to forego cyber espionage if the 
other is not as well, yet neither state is particularly better off in continuing cyber theft 
activities; thus, leaving both states with a situation akin to the tragedy of the commons. 
Therefore, international agreements and constraints can work to solve the problem by 
changing the incentive structure into a more beneficial outcome for both. 
2. Sustaining a Safe and Secure Environment 
Although diplomatic efforts and establishing greater bilateral ties with China is 
critical in solving the cyber problem, U.S. domestic policies must also work toward 
establishing a better cyber environment. While this thesis did not discuss U.S. efforts in 
depth, Chapter III briefly touched on the subject of improving defensive capabilities. 
Certainly, the debate over anonymity in cyberspace continues to be a major issue, 
particularly as one of the key ideological divides between the United States and China. 
What level of anonymity should users expect? What is the government’s role in ensuring 
that aspect? However, despite the controversial aspects of anonymity and other related 
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debates, there are still a few ways that the United States can work toward improving the 
cyber environment.  
Technological advancements in securing transmissions have greatly improved 
reliability and safety of using cyberspace. The development of Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) with Transport Layer Security (TLS), or HTTPS, vastly improved how 
secure Internet functions can be. For example, older malicious techniques like website 
spoofing are much less viable. Browsers inform the user that a site may not be legitimate. 
Additionally, higher tier encryption methods like SHA-256 over DES help mitigate the 
problem of brute force hacking, especially considering parallel developments in 
processing power. Thus, although technological advancements improve malicious actor 
capabilities, cyber defenses grow as well. 
While artificially generating innovation and other elements of total factor 
productivity (TFP) is not necessarily possible, or reliable, through changes in U.S. policy, 
policy can impact adherence and implementation of improved security methods. As 
discussed by proponents of free market theory, government regulations are often 
inefficient as an artificial means to control market behavior. As Donald Real’s article, 
“Saving Fisheries with Free Markets,” showed, however, government regulation can fix 
problems where the free market produces perverse results.229 Generally, most companies 
face little incentive to improve cyber security measures until it is too late. The recent 
Equifax breach at the end of 2017 is the latest example of the lack of incentive to fix 
major security gaps. Although specific details have yet to be released, early reports by 
Matt Tait and Brian Krebs suggest a conscious decision to ignore potential security gaps 
which are largely unchecked by government regulations.230 Hence, U.S. policies can go a 
long way to simply ensuring security in cyberspace.  
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3. Future Trajectory of Attacks 
A key element of the Agreement’s success rests upon the future. The results 
examined in this thesis cover relatively short-term data. Therefore, it is possible that the 
result of the Agreement will be a short-term drop, particularly if new U.S. administrations 
ease off commitments of sanctions and other punitive measures. This thesis, however, 
argues that possibility is unlikely. Forming the Agreement provides a level of inertia, 
making a reversal of position on the part of the Chinese more difficult compared to if the 
Agreement was never formed. Moreover, bilateral mechanisms in place as a result of the 
Agreement, including law enforcement changes, cannot be easily undone. Although 
informal, relationships on a first-name basis tend to provide resistance to attempts at 
completely dissolving ties.  
Consequently, the Trump administration, as well as future administrations on both 
the U.S. and Chinese side, will play a major role in continuing cooperative efforts, but the 
Agreement has done well to insulate bilateral communication and cooperation from the 
rigors of short-term politics. U.S.-China cyber relations can still deteriorate, especially if 
one side discovers disingenuous efforts to undermine the spirit of the Agreement. Even in 
that case, however, it is more likely the two sides will work together to solve problems if 
counter-efforts stem from lower level agencies or, if the problem stems from higher 
levels, unravel and untangle slowly from the cooperative mechanisms in place. 
4. Summary 
In sum, pursuit of global norms and a better, more cooperative cyber relationship 
with China, coupled with domestic capabilities, offers a much more promising future. 
The results of the Agreement suggest working cooperatively with China is producing 
welcome results. As history has sometimes demonstrated, treating China, or any country, 
as an enemy may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.231 Furthermore, working cooperatively 
produces much greater outcomes than working as adversaries or even just individually. 
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As a result, while the United States should continue to monitor Chinese actions, if current 
results continue, so too should cooperative efforts. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
Although this thesis concluded that the results of the Agreement suggest that 
China is making sincere efforts to improve U.S.-China cyber relations and solve the 
cyber problem, efforts to monitor the results must continue, for both past and future data.  
In terms of past data, including the data covered in this thesis, analysis can 
continue in three ways. One, regarding the volume of attacks, future research should seek 
additional sources. FireEye is the only source that breaks out volume of attacks attributed 
to China, thus any additional data source can help prevent source bias. Additionally, as a 
U.S. cybersecurity firm, FireEye has a conflict of interests. Given that FireEye is 
contracted by the U.S. government, there is a tacit need to report a level cyberattacks to 
justify the company’s existence and utility. Thus, reporting by third-party watchdog 
groups could add a better layer of credibility in judging results.  
Two, as discussed in Chapter IV, many of the reports on cyberattacks lacked 
specific details to analyze. What data was taken? How, exactly, did the attacker gain 
access? The lack of such details limits the analysis. Last, better techniques and models 
can go a long way toward better analysis. The model used in this thesis to repurpose the 
Schmitt Analysis has room for improvement. Stronger definitions and parameters, 
particularly in cybersecurity terms, can more accurately define the results. Additionally, 
each cyberattack is generally composed of countless smaller attacks. From scouting to 
actual infiltration to exfiltration, new techniques in identifying and tying together attacks 
to an operation can provide better perspective on whether China is truly complying with 
the spirit of the Agreement or not. 
With regard to future data, continuity of results is paramount for whether the 
Agreement is or is not a success—or, as the idiom goes, only time will tell. Two years for 
a bilateral agreement is still relatively short. Thus, as time passes, analysis should 
continue in order to better predict whether or not the trend in Chinese cyberattacks is 
continuing. Furthermore, as the CCP continues to make strides in cyber policy and to 
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form additional bilateral agreements, the United States can more accurately determine 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
115 
APPENDIX A. 2015 WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET 
Following is the complete White House Fact Sheet from the 2015 talks between 
President Xi and President Obama. The full text provides the context surrounding the 
2015 U.S.-Cyber Agreement, showing the multitude of additional stipulations the two 
leaders discussed outside of the cyber espionage aspect discussed in this thesis.232  
 
The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Immediate Release 
September 25, 2015 
FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States 
On September 24–25, 2015, President Barack Obama hosted President Xi Jinping of 
China for a State visit.  The two heads of state exchanged views on a range of global, 
regional, and bilateral subjects.  President Obama and President Xi agreed to work 
together to constructively manage our differences and decided to expand and deepen 
cooperation in the following areas:  
Addressing Global and Regional Challenges 
 Afghanistan-  The United States and China decided to maintain communication 
and cooperation with one another on Afghanistan to support peaceful reconstruction and 
economic development in Afghanistan, support an “Afghan led, Afghan owned” 
reconciliation process, and promote trilateral dialogue among the United States, China, 
and Afghanistan.  Together with Afghanistan, the United States and China will co-chair a 
high-level event on Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development on the margins of the 
UN General Assembly on September 26.  This event will convene Afghanistan’s 
neighbors and the international community to discuss the importance of continuing robust 
regional and international support for the Afghan government and regional economic 
cooperation.  The United States and China jointly renew their call on the Taliban to enter 
into direct talks with the Government of Afghanistan.  The United States and China also 
noted their mutual interests in supporting peace, stability, and prosperity in neighboring 
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countries of Afghanistan, and to working in partnership with these countries to promote 
peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. 
 Peacekeeping-  In recognition of the critical role UN and regional peacekeepers 
serve in maintaining international peace and security, the United States and China affirm 
to further increase their robust commitments to international peacekeeping efforts.  The 
Chinese side appreciates the U.S. side’s holding of the Leaders’ Summit on 
Peacekeeping, and welcomes the new contributions to be announced by the United States 
to support peace operations. The United States welcomes the new contributions to be 
announced by China to support UN peacekeeping efforts.  The United States and China 
recognize the need to deepen the partnership between the African Union and the United 
Nations on peace operations.  Both sides look forward to an enhanced discussion with the 
African Union and other partners to further explore proposals to this end.  Both sides 
decided to continue discussions to deepen cooperation on capacity building for troop- and 
police-contributing countries. 
 Nuclear Security-  The United States and China commit to deepen their 
cooperation on nuclear security and to work together to make the Nuclear Security 
Summit hosted by President Obama next year a success.  The two sides plan to hold an 
annual bilateral dialogue on nuclear security, with the first meeting of the dialogue to be 
held prior to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.  
 Wildlife Trafficking-  The United States and China, recognizing the importance 
and urgency of combating wildlife trafficking, commit to take positive measures to 
address this global challenge.  The United States and China commit to enact nearly 
complete bans on ivory import and export, including significant and timely restrictions on 
the import of ivory as hunting trophies, and to take significant and timely steps to halt the 
domestic commercial trade of ivory.  The two sides decided to further cooperate in joint 
training, technical exchanges, information sharing, and public education on combating 
wildlife trafficking, and enhance international law enforcement cooperation in this field.  
The United States and China decided to cooperate with other nations in a comprehensive 
effort to combat wildlife trafficking.  
 Ocean Conservation-  The United States and China intend to pursue actively 
cooperation on polar and ocean matters, including projects related to ocean conservation 
and expanding joint polar research efforts, and will work together on the proposal to 
establish a Marine Protected Area (MPA) in Antarctica’s Ross Sea.  The two sides also 
plan to support additional bilateral efforts in these fields, including ocean acidification 
monitoring and a partnership between the coastal cities of Xiamen and Weihai in China 
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and San Francisco and New York in the United States to share best practices to reduce 
the flow of trash into the ocean. 
Strengthening Development Cooperation 
The United States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding that 
establishes a framework for development cooperation to guide our future collaborative 
efforts.  The MOU recognizes our shared objectives in ending extreme poverty and 
advancing global development through enhanced collaboration and communication 
under the principle of development raised, agreed, and led by recipient countries.   
 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  The United States and China are 
committed to advance sustainable and inclusive international development as laid out in 
the new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, through expanded cooperation to 
end poverty and hunger and the promotion of inclusive economic growth, and protection 
of the environment.  The two sides intend to communicate and cooperate in implementing 
the Agenda and to help other countries achieve common development goals. 
 Food Security-  The United States and China decided to enhance cooperation on 
global food security.  The two sides intend to enhance communication and coordination 
with the government of Timor Leste and share lessons learned in agricultural 
development and food security while exploring prospects for further cooperation.  
Separately, the two sides intend to explore opportunities to cooperate on climate smart 
agriculture to produce more and better food for growing populations, while building the 
resilience of smallholder farmers.  Such efforts may include technical cooperation, such 
as on climate friendly irrigation and mechanization for smallholder farmers in Africa to 
advance our shared interest in addressing the impact of climate change and enhancing 
food security. 
 Public Health and Global Health Security-  The United States and China 
decided to enhance concrete cooperation in public health and global health security, 
accelerating full implementation of the World Health Organization International Health 
Regulations and assisting at-risk countries to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
disease threats.  The two sides plan to jointly work with the African Union and African 
Union Member States in the establishment of the Africa Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention and collaborate with partner governments in countries in West Africa to 
strengthen national public health capacities in the wake of Ebola, including strengthening 
the capacity of the cadres of public health and front line health workers.  The two sides 
intend to enhance communication and exchanges regarding aid for health in West Africa.  
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The two sides plan to continue to support and contribute to the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 
 Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response-  The United States and China 
decided to expand cooperation on humanitarian response to disasters.  The United States 
and China plan to participate constructively in the May 2016 World Humanitarian 
Summit.  The two sides plan to expand existing cooperation on disaster response through 
increased support to multilateral mechanisms, including the United Nations International 
Search and Rescue Advisory Group.  The two sides intend to conduct capacity building 
cooperation for the post-earthquake reconstruction in Nepal through mechanisms that 
promote collaboration between the international community and the Government of 
Nepal. 
 Multilateral Institutions.  The United States and China intend to expand their 
collaboration with international institutions to tackle key global development challenges. 
Strengthening Bilateral Relations 
 Military Relations-  Building on the two Memoranda of Understanding on 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) signed by the United States and China in 
November 2014, the two sides completed new annexes on air-to-air safety and crisis 
communications. The two sides committed to continue discussions on additional annexes 
to the Notification of Major Military Activities CBM, with the United States prioritizing 
completion of a mechanism for informing the other party of ballistic missile launches.  
The U.S. Coast Guard and the China Coast Guard have committed to pursue an 
arrangement whose intended purpose is equivalent to the Rules of Behavior Confidence 
Building Measure annex on surface-to-surface encounters in the November 2014 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of Defense and 
the People’s Republic of China Ministry of National Defense. 
 Cybersecurity-  
o The United States and China agree that timely responses should be 
provided to requests for information and assistance concerning malicious cyber 
activities.  Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a manner consistent with their 
respective national laws and relevant international obligations, with requests to 
investigate cybercrimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity 
emanating from their territory.  Both sides also agree to provide updates on the status and 
results of those investigation to the other side, as appropriate.  
o The United States and China agree that neither country’s government will 
conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade 
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secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing 
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.  
o Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify and 
promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within the international 
community.  The United States and China welcome the July 2015 report of the UN Group 
of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International security, which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial 
issues for international security in cyberspace.  The two sides also agree to create a senior 
experts group for further discussions on this topic.  
o The United States and China agree to establish a high-level joint dialogue 
mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues.  China will designate an official at 
the ministerial level to be the lead and the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State 
Security, Ministry of Justice, and the State Internet and Information Office will 
participate in the dialogue.  The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the U.S. 
Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue, with participation from representatives from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Intelligence Community and other agencies, 
for the United States.  This mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality 
of responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to malicious cyber 
activity of concern identified by either side.  As part of this mechanism, both sides agree 
to establish a hotline for the escalation of issues that may arise in the course of 
responding to such requests.  Finally, both sides agree that the first meeting of this 
dialogue will be held by the end of 2015, and will occur twice per year thereafter. 
 Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism- President Obama and President Xi 
decided to continue expanding law enforcement and anti-corruption cooperation, 
including by enhancing coordination and cooperation on criminal investigations, 
repatriation of fugitives, and asset recovery issues.  The United States and China 
welcomed recent progress on repatriating Chinese fugitives and illegal immigrants 
through charter flights and look forward to continuing this cooperation.  The United 
States welcomes China’s commitment to consider joining the OECD Working Group on 
Bribery as a participant in the near future.  As a new aspect of the Joint Liaison Group’s 
role as the primary mechanism for law enforcement cooperation, both sides committed to 
discuss the mutual recognition and enforcement of forfeiture judgments.  The two sides 
condemn all forms of terrorism and committed to expand exchange of information to 
counter the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters.  The United States and China 
held a Counter-Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) Workshop on September 14 in 
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Washington, DC, decided on principles for furthering efforts to counter the threat posed 
by IEDs, and committed to hold a follow-on workshop in China.   
 People-to-People Exchange.   The United States and China announced two new 
initiatives to expand the dynamic and positive people-to-people interaction that is the 
foundation of our bilateral relationship: (1) A 2016 U.S.-China Tourism Year—a 
cooperative tourism initiative led by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the China 
National Tourism Administration to expand and shape travel between our countries.  This 
year of collaboration will include events to promote travel between the two countries, 
support progress on market access, and advance initiatives for both the United States and 
China to ensure a quality visitor experience for increasing numbers of travelers to and 
from both nations.  (2)  A “One Million Strong” initiative led by the 100,000 Strong 
Foundation that aims to have one million American students studying Mandarin by 2020. 
“One Million Strong” goals include doubling the number of Mandarin language teachers 
in the United States through a major investment in teachers colleges; employing 
technological tools to engage students in underserved and underrepresented communities; 
and creating “100K Strong States,” a subnational consortium of U.S. governors 
committed to expanding Mandarin language-learning in their states.  
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LuckyCat  Jun‐11  Apr‐12  25  50  40  75  10  10  80  290 
The 
Elderwood 
Project  Dec‐09  Sep‐12  60  60  80  75  30  25  70  400 
APT 1  Feb‐06  May‐14  80  60  60  75  70  80  90  515 
The Nitro 
Attacks  Apr‐11  Sep‐11  60  80  80  70  30  80  75  475 
Night 
Dragon  Nov‐09  Feb‐11  25  30  80  65  30  80  70  380 
Byzantine 
Hades  Apr‐09  Jun‐10  70  20  90  85  80  10  80  435 
GhostNet  May‐07  Mar‐09  40  30  70  70  30  70  60  370 
Honker 





Group  May‐06  Jun‐07  25  70  70  40  20  20  90  335 
The Chinese 
Time Bomb  Feb‐13  Feb‐13  10  10  70  40  30  80  60  300 
Operation 
















Aurora  Jul‐09  Jan‐10  20  40  60  30  20  10  50  230 
Titan Rain  Nov‐03  Nov‐04  80  70  80  80  80  10  80  480 
US Satellite 
Hack  Oct‐07  Jul‐08  70  90  90  90  90  10  30  470 
State 
Department 
Emails  Apr‐08  Oct‐08  20  10  30 
Morgan 
Stanley  Jan‐10  Jan‐10  20  20 
NASA 






agencies  May‐13  May‐13  30  30 
Community 
Health 
Systems  Apr‐14  Jun‐14  40  80  80  60  20  90  50  420 
Su Bin  Jan‐09  Dec‐13  90  80  90  90  90  10  90  540 
US 
TRANSCOM  Jun‐12  May‐13  30  30  20  50  20  10  50  210 
















Technology  Sep‐16  Sep‐16  60  90  90  10  90  90  15  445 
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LuckyCat  Jun‐11 Apr‐12 2 7 
The Elderwood Project  Dec‐09 Sep‐12 2 7 
APT 1  Feb‐06 May‐14 2 7 
The Nitro Attacks  Apr‐11 Sep‐11 2 7 
Night Dragon  Nov‐09 Feb‐11 2 7 
Byzantine Hades  Apr‐09 Jun‐10 2 7 
GhostNet  May‐07 Mar‐09 0 7 
Honker Union  May‐98 Sep‐13 0 3 
Wicked Rose’ and the NCPH 
Hacking Group  May‐06 Jun‐07 1 7 
The Chinese Time Bomb  Feb‐13 Feb‐13 0 7 
Operation Shady RAT  Jul‐06 Sep‐10 2 7 
                                                 
233 See footnote 242 for full source list.  
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Operation Aurora  Jul‐09 Jan‐10 1 7 
Titan Rain  Nov‐03 Nov‐04 0 7 
US Satellite Hack  Oct‐07 Jul‐08 0 7 
State Department Emails  Apr‐08 Oct‐08 0
Morgan Stanley  Jan‐10 Jan‐10 2
NASA Intrusion  Jan‐11 Mar‐12 2
U.S. Department of Labor 
and at least nine other 
agencies  May‐13 May‐13 0
Community Health Systems  Apr‐14 Jun‐14 0 7 
Su Bin  Jan‐09 Dec‐13 0 7 
US TRANSCOM  Jun‐12 May‐13 0
Black Vine  Dec‐12 Feb‐15 2 7 
SS&C Technology  Sep‐16 Sep‐16 2
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APPENDIX D. 2015 U.S.-CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT 
DOCUMENTS 
The following text provides the specific language from the three documents 
concerning the Agreement. 
From the “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s 
Republic of China in Joint Press Conference”234: 
 
President Obama: I raised once again our very serious concerns about 
growing cyber-threats to American companies and American citizens. I 
indicated that it has to stop. The United States government does not 
engage in cyber economic espionage for commercial gain. And today, I 
can announce that our two countries have reached a common 
understanding on the way forward. We’ve agreed that neither the U.S. 
or the Chinese government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-
enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other 
confidential business information for commercial advantage. In 
addition, we’ll work together, and with other nations, to promote 
international rules of the road for appropriate conduct in cyberspace.  
 
So this is progress. But I have to insist that our work is not yet done. I 
believe we can expand our cooperation in this area, even as the United 
States will continue to use all of the tools at our disposal to protect 
American companies, citizens and interests. 
  
President Xi: China and the United States are two major cyber 
countries and we should strengthen dialogue and cooperation. 
Confrontation and friction are not made by choice for both sides. 
During my visit, competent authorities of both countries have reached 
important consensus on joint fight against cyber-crimes. Both sides 
agree to step up crime cases, investigation assistance and information-
sharing. And both government will not be engaged in or knowingly 
support online theft of intellectual properties. And we will explore the 
formulation of appropriate state, behavior and norms of the cyberspace. 
And we will establish a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on the 
fight against cyber-crimes and related issues, and to establish hotline 
links. 
 
Democracy and human rights are the common pursuit of mankind. At 
the same time, we must recognize that countries have different 
historical processes and realities, and we need to respect people of all 
countries in the right to choose their own development path 
independently. 
 
                                                 
234 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press 
Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2014,  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. 
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The Chinese people are seeking to realize the great renew of the 
Chinese nation, which is the Chinese history. This process in essence is 
a process to achieve social equity and justice and advancing human 
rights. China stands ready to, in the spirit of equality and mutual 
respect, conduct human rights dialogue with the United States, expand 
consensus, reduce differences, learn from each other, and progress 
together. 
 
President Obama:  Okay, we’re going to take a few questions.  We’re 
going to start with Margaret Talev of Bloomberg.  
  
Q:    Thank you, Mr. President.  President Obama and President Xi, I’d 
like to talk to you about cyber.  If I am an American business and I’m 
being hacked by Chinese pirates who are trying to steal my intellectual 
property, what firm assurances can you give us today that things are 
going to get better, and when?   
  
President Obama, are you satisfied enough about the steps that China is 
taking to hold off on imposing any new sanctions to this end?  Or what 
do you still need to see?   
  
And, President Xi, could we expect prosecutions of Chinese people and 
organizations who have hacked American businesses?  And if the U.S. 
did sanction anyone in China, would you respond with sanctions?  
  
President Obama:  I’ll take them in order.  With respect to cyber, this 
has been a serious discussion between myself and President Xi since 
we first met in Sunnylands.  And the good news, from my perspective, 
is, is that in the lead-up to and then finalized during our meetings here 
today, we have, I think, made significant progress in agreeing to how 
our law enforcement and investigators are going to work together, how 
we’re going to exchange information, how we are going to go after 
individuals or entities who are engaging in cyber-crimes or cyber-
attacks.  And we have jointly affirmed the principle that governments 
don’t engage in cyber-espionage for commercial gain against 
companies. That all I consider to be progress.   
  
What I’ve said to President Xi and what I say to the American people is 
the question now is, are words followed by actions.  And we will be 
watching carefully to make an assessment as to whether progress has 
been made in this area.   
  
With respect to the various tools that we have to go after those who are 
attacking our companies or trying to extract trade secrets or data, we 
have traditional law enforcement tools, but—as I indicated a while back 
—through executive action, I’ve also instituted the ability to impose 
sanctions on individuals or entities where we have proof that they’ve 
gone after U.S. companies or U.S. persons.   
  
And we did not, at our level, have specific discussions of specific cases. 
 But I did indicate to President Xi that we will apply those and 
whatever other tools we have in our toolkit to go after cyber criminals, 
either retrospectively or prospectively.  Those are tools generally that 
are not directed at governments; they are directed at entities or 
individuals that we can identify.  And they’re not unique to China. 
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 Those are tools that we’re going to be using for cyber criminals around 
the world. 
  
And President Xi, during these discussions, indicated to me that, with 
1.3 billion people, he can’t guarantee the behavior of every single 
person on Chinese soil—which I completely understand.  I can’t 
guarantee the actions of every single American.  What I can guarantee, 
though, and what I’m hoping President Xi will show me, is that we are 
not sponsoring these activities, and that when it comes to our attention 
that non-governmental entities or individuals are engaging in this stuff, 
that we take it seriously and we’re cooperating to enforce the law. 
  
The last point I’ll make on the cyber issue—because this is a global 
problem, and because, unlike some of the other areas of international 
cooperation, the rules in this area are not well developed, I think it’s 
going to very important for the United States and China, working with 
other nations and the United Nations and other—and the private sector, 
to start developing an architecture to govern behavior in cyberspace 
that is enforceable and clear.   
  
It doesn’t mean that we’re going it prevent every cyber-crime, but it 
does start to serve as a template whereby countries know what the rules 
are, they’re held accountable, and we’re able to jointly go after non-
state actors in this area.  
  
President Xi:  (As interpreted.)  Madam reporter has raised the 
cybersecurity issue.  Indeed, at current, for the international community 
and for China and the United States, this is an issue all attach great 
importance to.  With President Obama and I have on many occasions—
and this is a long history—have exchange of views on this.  I think it’s 
fair to say we’ve reached a lot of consensus on cybersecurity, including 
some new consensus. 
  
Overall, the United States is the strongest country in terms of cyber 
strength.  China is the world’s biggest cyber country in terms of the 
number of Web users.  We have more than 600 million of netizens. 
 Our two sides should cooperate because cooperation will benefit both, 
and confrontation will lead to losses on both sides.  We are entirely 
able to carry out government department and expert levels of dialogue 
and exchanges to strengthen our cooperation in many respects and turn 
the cybersecurity between the two countries into a new growth source, 
rather than a point of confrontation between the two sides. 
  
China strongly opposes and combats the theft of commercial secrets 
and other kinds of hacking attacks.  The U.S. side, if has concerns in 
this respect, we can, through the exiting channels, express those 
concerns.  The Chinese side will take seriously the U.S. provision of 
any information.  Now, we have already, and in the future, we will still, 
through the law enforcement authorities, maintain communication and 
coordination on this matter, and appropriately address them.    
So, all in all, we have broad, common interest in the field of the cyber. 
 But we need to strengthen cooperation and avoid leading to 
confrontation.  And nor should we politicize this issue.  During my 
current visit, I think it’s fair to say that the two sides, concerning 
combatting cyber-crimes, have reached a lot of consensus.  Going 
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forward, we need to, at an early date, reach further agreement on them 





From the “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States”235: 
  
Cybersecurity-  
The United States and China agree that timely responses should be 
provided to requests for information and assistance concerning 
malicious cyber activities. Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a 
manner consistent with their respective national laws and relevant 
international obligations, with requests to investigate cybercrimes, 
collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity 
emanating from their territory. Both sides also agree to provide updates 
on the status and results of those investigation to the other side, as 
appropriate.  
The United States and China agree that neither country’s government 
will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual 
property, including trade secrets or other confidential business 
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to 
companies or commercial sectors.  
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify 
and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within 
the international community. The United States and China welcome the 
July 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
security, which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial issues for 
international security in cyberspace. The two sides also agree to create 
a senior experts group for further discussions on this topic.  
The United States and China agree to establish a high-level joint 
dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues. China 
will designate an official at the ministerial level to be the lead and the 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of 
Justice, and the State Internet and Information Office will participate in 
the dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and the U.S. 
Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue, with participation from 
representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. 
Intelligence Community and other agencies, for the United States. This 
mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality of 
responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to 
malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side. As part of 
this mechanism, both sides agree to establish a hotline for the 
escalation of issues that may arise in the course of responding to such 
requests. Finally, both sides agree that the first meeting of this dialogue 
will be held by the end of 2015, and will occur twice per year 
thereafter. 
 
                                                 
235 “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” The White House, 
September 25, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-
jinpings-state-visit-united-states. 
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From the “Full Text: Outcome list of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United 
States”236: 
 
48. China and the United States agree that timely responses should be 
provided to requests for information and assistance concerning 
malicious cyber activities. Further, both sides agree to cooperate, in a 
manner consistent with their respective national laws and relevant 
international obligations, with requests to investigate cybercrimes, 
collect electronic evidence, and mitigate malicious cyber activity 
emanating from their territory. Both sides also agree to provide updates 
on the status and results of those investigation to the other side, as 
appropriate. China and the United States agree that neither country’s 
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of 
intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential 
business information, with the intent of providing competitive 
advantages to companies or commercial sectors. 
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify 
and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within 
the international community. China and the United States welcome the 
July 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security, which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial issues 
for international security in cyberspace. 
The two sides also agree to create a senior experts group for further 
discussions on this topic. China and the United States agree to establish 
a high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and 
related issues. China will designate an official at the ministerial level to 
be the lead and the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State 
Security, Ministry of Justice, and the State Internet and Information 
Office will participate in the dialogue. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the U.S. Attorney General will co-chair the dialogue, with 
participation from representatives from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the U.S. Intelligence Community and other agencies, for 
the United States. 
This mechanism will be used to review the timeliness and quality of 
responses to requests for information and assistance with respect to 
malicious cyber activity of concern identified by either side. As part of 
this mechanism, both sides agree to establish a hotline for the 
escalation of issues that may arise in the course of responding to such 
requests. Finally, both sides agree that the first meeting of this dialogue 




                                                 
236 “ Full Text: Outcome list of President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States,” The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 26, 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1300771.shtml. 
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